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ABSTRACT
This research focuses on how South Korea's development model-namely, the Saemaul
Undong, or the New Village Movement-is diffused internationally, in particular, to the
developing country of Vietnam. South Korea's successful model has been diffused
through various different channels for years, mostly in the form of foreign aid projects.
Due to the prevailing view that international diffusion practices take place homogenously
(in a near-universally standardized manner) within the recipient communities, and due to
the propensity on the part of both donor and recipient governments to highlight only
successful cases of diffusion while not publicizing those that have failed, several key
questions, such as, how diffusion actually takes place, or how each project is likely to
bring about different outcomes based on who initiates or leads the project, and to what
extent this particular South Korean model has been viable and sustainable in the recipient
country, remain largely unveiled.
This research, therefore, aims to analyze the role of each stakeholder and how these
stakeholders-either personnel or institutions-make an impact on the degree of
diffusion of the Saemaul Undong process. It seeks to differentiate the impact of diffusion
between short-term or one-time aid projects and those that have managed to become a
sustainable development model in the recipient community. To be specific, the roles of
politicians, administrative officials at the local level, non-governmental agents, external
factors, and minor actors are investigated at the micro-level.
Thesis Advisor: Balakrishnan Rajagopal
Title: Associate Professor of Law and Development and Director of the Program on
Human Rights and Justice at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Thesis Reader: Sung-Yoon Lee
Title: Assistant Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
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CHAPTER 1. DIFFUSION OF DEVELOPMENT MODEL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Official Development Assistance (ODA) flowing from early developed
countries-namely the members of OECD-rose gradually in volume during the Cold
War, in particular from the late-1960s to the early 1990s. However, recession in the early
1990s led to a drop in total ODA by 16 percent in real terms from 1993 to 1997, before
picking up again in 1998 and peaking in the mid-2000s due to "exceptional debt relief'
programs for Iraq and Nigeria. As much as the developed countries of the world have
made tangible efforts in the post-Cold War era to eradicate poverty in less developed
countries, the flow of ODA has been uneven and woefully low for many developing
countries. Even paths to development paved with good intentions by international
institutions such as the United Nations, which established the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG) in 2000 with the view toward, among other goals, eradicating extreme
poverty and hunger, have come under strong criticism for their unilateral approach and
unquantifiable goals.
For achieving any developmental goals, such as achieving universal primary
education or promoting gender equality and maternal health, there is a crucial need to
develop the rural sector. Since a large portion of the population in developing countries
tend to be engaged in farming, the rural sector lags behind the urban population in
infrastructure, education, and social welfare programs. According to Edward Reed, there
is also a new urgency for addressing rural problems because these problems are
"generated by population pressure on land, water and other resources, threats to the
1 OECD, "Fifty years of official development assistance," Retrieved on May 3, 2013, from
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/50yearsofofficialdevelopmentassistance.htm
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environment, climate change, and widening income disparity between rural and urban
sectors."2 Nevertheless, rural regions in most developing countries the world over are
heavily marked by economic backwardness and underdevelopment, with few noticeable
signs of change in many cases. The development of the rural sector remains the key in
reaching the ambitious goals set by the MDG. Hence, any assessment of international
efforts to reduce poverty in developing countries should focus on the problem of relative
and substantial underdevelopment in the rural sector.
According to Seung-hun Chun, there are several reasons for the persistence of
poverty':
1) Many developing countries have undergone the history of colonization. This has
left the population with a negative mindset and profound displacement in terms of
self-rule and administration. Hence, there is the prevailing view that in former
colonies, negative attitudes such as mutual suspicion, suspicion of outside powers,
and a lack of a spirit of self-reliance linger. Since the mentality and behavior of
the people are not prone to change in the short-term, such attitudes born of
negative and painful colonial experience are a challenge to economic
development. But more than attitudes, the legacy of institutions, such as land
laws, that were designed to exploit the poor and enrich the colonialists and their
collaborators, stifle rural development today.
2) Even if a developing country is endowed with abundant natural resources, the
opportunity to make use of its resources is often negated and is exploited by more
2 Reed, Edward P. (September 30, 2010) "Is Saemaul Undong a Model for Developing Countries Today?"
A paper presented at the International Symposium in Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of Saemaul
Undong, hosted by the Korea Saemaul Undong Center, p.1.
3 Chun, Seung-hun (March 7, 2007) "Sharing the Korean experience for international development", A
paper presented for "Sharing of Development Experiences" at the ODA International Conference, p.5.
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powerful countries. Therefore, developing countries face a considerable
disadvantage in pursuing and sustaining an economic development program of
their own unfettered by the interests of bigger and richer nations.
3) Developing countries, it is often argued, are more prone to widespread corruption,
lack of competent governance, and stifled development capacity than
industrialized democracies. A debatable point this may be, but there is a
correlation between corruption and underdevelopment.
4) The North-South cooperation (NSC) has been creating more threats than
opportunities by inhibiting the developing countries to develop local enterprises,
which is necessary to reduce poverty and sustain development over the long term.
Bridging the tremendous North-South divide may be one goal of development
assistance at the macro level. The term "North" represents the first-tier developed
countries, mostly the richer countries of North America, Europe, Japan, Australia, and
New Zealand. The "South" represents the poorer majority of the countries in the world,
namely, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.4 Western scholars and practitioners concerned
with sluggish economic growth in developing countries have variously recommended that
developing governments shift their policies from "state-led dirigisme to market-oriented
policies."5 Developed countries have also reduced aid as a percentage of their gross
national income in the 1980s and 1990s in an attempt to reduce aid-dependency in
developing countries. At the same time, the dictates of the richer Northern countries have
also shown their limits, and therefore, have come under the following criticism:
4 Binka, Fred (2005) "North-South research collaboration: a move towards a true partnership?" Tropical
Medicine & International Health, 10 (3), pp. 207-209.
5 Gore, Charles (2000) "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing
Countries" World Development Vol. 28, No. 5, p.7 9 0 .
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1) The terms and priorities of a development model are often driven by the Northern
parties; therefore, they are unduly influenced by the developed countries. That, in
turn, means that these priorities may not always coincide with the highest
priorities of the Southern partner. This leads to the imposition of lopsided
priorities and agendas by the Northern states, which is incompatible with the
Southern states' long-term development goals of self-reliance.'
2) The goals, rationales, and conditionalities of the North sometimes differ radically
from the goals and opinions of the South. These conflicts at times defy resolution
and thereby jeopardize the success of the project.
3) The Washington consensus provided a one-size-fits-all solution to the problems of
development in Latin America: target nations were told to privatize and liberalize,
to slim down the size of the state, bear down on inflation, reduce their budget and
concentrate on exports.' The former president of World Bank, Robert Zoellick,
criticized that "there cannot be a consensus about political economy from one city
applying to all. It is now about experience regarding what is working-in New
Delhi, in Sao Paolo, in Beijing, in Cairo, and Accra."9
In other words, policymakers and development experts have come to take the view
that there is no universal formula for a successful program of development. For example,
the Cambridge University economist Ha-Joon Jang is an outspoken critic of the notion
that market capitalism is the answer for poor developing countries, arguing that no
6 Saxena, Badri N. (2006) Report of IWGM Workshop on North-South International Collaboration in
Microbicide Research. Cape Town, South Africa.
7 Oyugi, Edward (2004). "Rethinking aid: development cooperation in a multilateral crisis," Reality of Aid
Report: an Independent Review of Poverty reduction and Development Assistance, p.49.
8 Larry, E. (2010, September 30). A cautious welcome to the World Bank's rejection of old orthodoxies. the
Guardian, Retrieved on February 21, 2013, from http://www.guardian.coi.uk/global-development/poverty-
matters/201 0/sep/30/world-bank-washington-consensus-development
9 Ibid.
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country in history has ever built a successful development strategy exclusively based on
an anti-dirigiste free-trade model. In fact, all states, in varying degrees, have protected
their fledgling industries in the early stage of nation-building. This is evident in the
experience of India and China, not to mention OECD states like Japan and South Korea. 0
Since the 1970s, South-South cooperation (SSC) has gained attention in the field of
international development. By definition, SSC refers to cooperative activities between the
newly industrialized Southern countries and other less developed nations of the South."
The newly industrialized states of East Asia showed a remarkably fast and sustained
economic growth from 1965 to 1990. Amongst them, the so-called Four Asian Tigers-
Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan- were notable for maintaining
exceptionally high growth rates based on strong state intervention, even beyond their
predicted GDP per capita growth rates.12 While the common practice of state-business
collusion and corruption have raised complex questions regarding the relationship
between the government, the private sector, and the market, leaders in developing
countries nonetheless remain quite eager to imitate the East Asian development practices
and processes as they see these to be a spectacular success. As Kevin Gallagher remarks:
The 30-year record of the Washington consensus was abysmal
for Latin America, which grew less than 1% per year in per capita terms
during the period, in contrast with 2.6% during the period 1960-81.
East Asia, on the other hand, which is known for its state-managed
globalization has grown 6.7% per annum in per capita terms
10 Ibid.
" Corbin, Gary (2006, December 6) South-South Cooperation Defies the North. Global Envision:
Exploring Market-driven Solutions to Poverty. Retrieved on February 23, 2013,
from http://www.globalenvision.org/library/3/1371
12 Page, John (1994) "the East Asian Miracle: Four Lessons for Development Policy", National Bureau of
Economic Research Macroeconomics Annual, Volume 9, p. 221.
" Fourie, Elsje (2011, September 28) Africa looks to learn from East Asia's Development Experiences, the
Guardian, Retrieved on April 30, 2013, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-
matters/20 11 /sep/28/africa-east-asia-development-experiences
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since 1981, actually up from 3.5% in that same period."
The common characteristics of the SSC include:
1) The main purpose of SSC is to promote self-sufficiency among Southern nations
and to strengthen economic ties among states whose market power compare more
equally than in asymmetric North-South relationship.'-
2) The newly industrialized Southern countries have based their development plan
on more recent trends in development models, compared to the Northern
industrialized countries where some countries already reached developmental
success as early as the 1900s. Learning the lessons of experience from Southern
countries, it is argued, relatively reduces the need for trial and error in another
developing nation facing comparable conditions, thereby reducing costs and
16
enhancing efficiency.
3) SSC works best among the countries that share similar philosophies of
development, as well as environmental, climatic, cultural, and social aspects.
Common conditions are conducive to cooperation, or at least more conducive to
achieving positive results than merely following the recommendations of
17Northern countries.
1 Gallagher, Kevin (March 7, 2011) the end of the "Washington consensus", the Guardian, Retrieved on
April 30, 2013, from http://www .guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/ 2 0 11 /mar/07/china-usa
1- Corbin, Gary (2006, December 6) South-South Cooperation Defies the North, Global Envision, Retrieved
on April 30, 2013 from http://www.globalenvision.org/library/3/1371
16 Rosseel, P. De Corte E., Blommaert, J., & Verniers, E. (2009) Approaches to North-South, South-South
and North- South-South Collaboration: a Policy Document, Retrieved on April 30, 2013,
from https://Iirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/2296 3 6 /1/POLICY PAPER VLIR UWCNSS.pdf,
p. 18.
17 Nwanze, K. (2011, December 7) Keynote address by IFAD President at the South-South Development
Expo, IFAD, Retrieved on May 2, 2013, from http://www.ifad.org/events/op/201I/gssd.htm
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CHAPTER 2. SOUTH KOREA'S INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE
South Korea, a member of the OECD, also has a long history as a recipient of
foreign assistance. Having undergone 35 years under Japanese colonial rule and three
years brutality and destruction in the Korean War, extreme poverty and chaos used to be
common theme in South Korea. The nation received enormous volumes of foreign aid
between 1945 to the early 1990s. Total assistance is estimated to be USD 12.8 billion
from the international communities-heavily from the United States."
South Korea became an official member of Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on
November 2 5th, 2009. This is a significant incident not only for South Korea, but also to
the international development community in general, since it is the first time ever in
history that a recipient country transformed itself to a donor country. More importantly,
this transformation took place in less than half a century, and in spite of South Korea
enduring a long, repressive rule by imperial Japan and the devastation wrought by the
Korean War.
Since its landmark transition, South Korea has been making several attempts to
export its local community development model called "Saemaul Undong," also known as
the "New Village Movement." By literal translation, "Saemaul" means "new village" and
"Undong" means "movement." This rural revitalization campaign transformed South
Korea's rural communities in the 1970s. And the model has become a national brand for
South Korea to share its own development experience with developing countries. In
18 Chun, H. et al. (2010, August) South Korea as an emerging donor: Challenges and changes on its
entering OECD/DAC. Journal of International Development, Volume 22, Issue 6 p. 790.
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recent years, governments and local leaders from Asia, Africa, and Latin America have
expressed earnest interest in learning how South Korea's rural sector was transformed so
quickly in the early period of the nation's development.' 9
CHAPTER 3. THESIS QUESTION
There have been an increasing number of cases of South Korean organizations or
provincial administration signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or sister
agreement with international counterparts to implement the Saemaul practices abroad.
However, how the project is differentiated based on who initiates or leads the project,
how the project is processed, and whether the Korean model has been viable and
sustainable in the recipient villages remain largely unveiled. In other words, my basic
thesis question is: How has the Saemaul diffusion taken place?
One of the reasons for the ongoing obscurity with respect to how the diffusion of the
Saemaul Movement has happened is the common assumption that international diffusion
practices take place homogenously-or in a near-universal manner-within the recipient
communities depending on the leadership capacities of those in charge of such program
initiatives. Moreover, the activities initiated by the government-both donor and
recipient-often exhibit only successful stories and shroud any failures. Because these
records of governmental activities are not easily accessible, there are not many region-
specific research papers on Saemaul diffusion practices.
While there are numerous reports on how the Saemaul Undong should be applied
internationally, there is no region-specific empirical study, and no research give attention
13
'9 Reed (2010) p. 12.
to diffusion projects carried out by different actors. I find qualitative differences in the
nature of the cases initiated or led by different types of actors. My research selects three
cases by mutually exclusive but collectively exhaustive ways so that neither the selection
nor the collection of cases is random but structured in a comprehensive way to
encapsulate all possible kinds of cases in the diffusion initiatives of the Saemaul
Movement in Vietnam.
As I have researched different international diffusion cases of the Saemaul Undong
model in developing countries, I came to realize that several differences lie in the
diffusion cases. The process, impact, outcome and sustainability of the projects were all
different depending on who was mostly involved in the process of international diffusion.
Therefore, it is my intention to find out the role of each stakeholder and how these
stakeholders (either personnel or institution) make a significant impact on the degree of
diffusion of a rural development model such as the Saemaul Undong.
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW
Section I. Evolution of Foreign Aid: the Agricultural Sector
More than half a century has passed since development assistance from developed
countries was first implemented. Most aid programs have explicitly stated their main
purpose as eradicating poverty and accelerating development process in the less
developed countries. When foreign aid was first introduced in the 1950s, the focus was
mainly on agricultural development. The first generation of aid-givers identified the
development of the agricultural sector as the key. Through aid and assistance, the leading
philanthropic institutions in developed countries-such as the Rockefeller Foundation-
sought to increase the output of agricultural goods and shared farming skills with local
14
farmers in the developing countries. Significant advance in agricultural technology, it
was believed, could be applied to the task at hand and bring about results.
The investment in agricultural development continued until the Green Revolution
in Asia between the 1960s and 1970s when agriculture was modernized through
petrochemical fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and improved strains .20 The prevailing
view at the time that Asian countries, with their long history of basing their economies on
agriculture, were the major beneficiaries of agricultural aid, is widely held even today.
The typical view on agricultural aid as applied to Asia is: "Foreign aid, with an emphasis
on agriculture, has played a major role in Asian growth. First in Taiwan, then in
Southeast Asia, and now in South Asia." Once Asian countries constructed the basic
infrastructure, received Western technology on farming, and farmers formed partial
political power, they continued to successfully grow without major foreign aid. In the
early 1990s, however, global bilateral and multilateral aid to the agricultural sector
dropped to nearly one-third of its prior volume as substantial investment in development
took place in the urban sector.
At the same time, foreign aid in the 1980s and 1990s became prejudicial toward
agricultural aid, which had a particular negative effect on Africa,24 where the region
remains to this day heavily dependent on agricultural production. In recent years, the
view that the poor could be lifted up without getting agriculture moving, has emerged.
Changes in the methodology of development aid has called to attention sectoral balance,
20 Coren, MJ., Scared of Genetically Modified Food? It Might Be the Only Way to Feed the World, Fast
Company, Retrieved on April 30, 2013, from http://www.fastcoexist.com/1681081/scared-of-genetically-
modified-food-it-might-be-the-only-way-to-feed-the-world
21 Eicher, C.K. (1998) International Agricultural Development 3rd Ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press p. 55.
22 Ibid. p. 55.
23 Ibid. p. 57.
24 Ibid. p. 59.
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input balance, and institutional development, which would variously respond to price
signals, as judged by development economists. In light of this new thinking, donors in
developed nations have shifted their focus to long term goals of environmental
enhancement, broad-based development, democratization, in particular targeting group
such as women and children, in their efforts to reduce world poverty. With the advent of
new innovation such as genetically modified organisms (GMO), diffusion of advanced
technology also has gained attention in developing countries as a solution to food
shortage and climate change.
Today, many agricultural researchers argue that the poorest countries' problems
are still mostly rural issues, and the basic cure to this is to raise rural incomes -therefore,
it is necessary to re-concentrate on agricultural aid.2 s It delivers direct benefit to the poor
since agriculture is the primary occupation of the rural sector, and therefore, raising
agricultural production would increase opportunities for rural employment and income.26
The importance of agriculture and farmers in promoting economic growth has been
overlooked in recent years, all the more in view of the empirical evidence that India and
China, by concentrating on agricultural development, have actually lifted tens of millions
of people from poverty."
Section II. Region-Specific Literature: Vietnam
A. Vietnam: Political Economy and Rural Development
25 Ibid. p .64.
26 Le, T.H. & Winters, P. (2001 December) Aid Policies and Poverty Alleviation: the Case of Viet Nam,
Asia-Pacific Development Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 13.
27 Ibid. p. 62 (studies of Ravallion and Datt in 1996 and World Bank in 1996). However, this view is not
universally accepted.
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In the wake of the fall of Saigon in 1975, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was
established as the country became reunified. Since then, Vietnam has pursued rapid neo-
Stalinist industrialization. And in the early 1980s, the country started to reform state
enterprises to operate in markets and with partial de-collectivization taking place.
However, despite several attempts at reform, Vietnam's economic output stayed
inefficient due to a highly centralized planned economy in which the state controlled
resource allocation entirely. As Thu Huong Le and Paul Winters observe, "the situation
has been described as an extreme market failure or a classic characteristic of shortage
economy."2"
The most important change in Vietnam's economic policy began with a major
campaign to implement partial reforms in the mid- 1980s.29 In 1986, the national
government launched a political and economic renewal campaign called Doi Moi
("Renovation") reforms. This led the country from a centralized economy to a "socialist-
oriented market economy." The progressive reform brought change in the country's
urban development patterns: 1) the diversification of capital investment, especially the
influx of foreign direct investment, 2) the creation of a property market dealing with land
use rights and private businesses, and 3) the commercialization of the housing sector that
created significant change. Yet, the planning system, with single political party, remained
unchanged.3
28 Quang, N. & Kammeier, H.D. (2002, December) "Changes in the political economy of Vietnam and
their impacts on the built environment of Hanoi", Cities, Volume 19, Issue 6, p. 374.
29 It should be noted that Vietnam and China's transitional models are different from those of other
countries, as both adopted a gradual transition model due to reluctance to change their single-party political
system.
30 Quang & Kammeier, (2002) p. 373.
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In sum, while the country has been on the path of transitional economy that
combines government planning with free-market incentives, there is little evidence of
change in the political system.31 The country remains a one-party state, where the
consensus of troika-the President of the State, the Government Prime Minister, and the
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Secretary General -rules under the CPV .3
According to the World Bank, the impact of Doi Moi has been impressive, particularly in
view of the fact that it has been sustainable. More than 3,000 private businesses have
been created, and the economy has been growing at more than 7 percent annually. 3 From
being one of the poorest countries in the world with per capita income below USD 100,
Doi Moi, by the end of 2010, had transformed Vietnam to a lower-middle income country
with per capita income of USD 1,130. Moreover, the ratio of population below the
poverty line has fallen from 58 percent in 1993 to 14.5 percent in 2008.34 All this has
taken place within a quarter of century.
Before NTP-NRD (National Target Programme-New Rural Development) was
launched in 2010, there were several plans and policies on rural development: 1) the
"Tam Nong" Resolution 26 in the 2008 Socio-Economic Development Plan, 2) the Policy
3 tMattner, M., (2004, April) "Power to the People? Local Governance and Politics in Vietnam",
Environment & Urbanization, Volume 16, No. 1, p. 12.
31 United Nations, (2004, February) "the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Public Administration Country
Profile", p. 2, Retrieved on May 1, 2013 from
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpanO23247.pdf
3 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (2005, December) "Country Profile: Vietnam", p. 8.
Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Vietnam.pdf
34 The World Bank, Vietnam Overview, Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/overview
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Framework for the Implementation of the five year plan 2006-2010, 3) the Budget Law,
4) the Public Administration Reform (PAR), and 5) Poverty resolution.35
Each of these plans and documents were used as the basis for further developing
rural development plans. The NTP-NRD, for example, is mostly derived from the Tam
Nong Resolution. The NTP-NRD is an ambitious nationwide program that is designed for
the period 2010-2020. Several ministries and agencies have been involved in this plan,
with the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development (MARD) taking on the leading
role. Tam Nong Resolution 26 was used as the base for designing the NTP-NRD. Its
focus is on the development of agriculture and rural areas as well as improving the living
conditions of farmers. It set forth general and specific objectives to be attained by 2020.
Criteria for 19 areas of social, economic, cultural, and environmental dimensions of the
rural sector have been identified, with corresponding targets being established.
The NTP-NRD was approved by the Prime Minister in 2011 along with other 15
NTPs. However, despite tangible improvement through Doi Moi and NTP-NRD,
Vietnam's remote and rural areas did not significantly "benefit from the communal
privileges under the command economy, and accordingly, were not greatly affected by
the transition."3" Several studies show weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Vietnam's rural
sector:
1) The government revised and proposed the extension of land-use rights from 20 to 50
years for farmers. However, even a 50 year-term is still too short for sustainable
3s Rudengren J., Huong, N.T.L. & Anna von Wachenfelt, A. (2012, April) "Rural Development Policies in
Vietnam: Transitioning from Central Planning to a Market Economy" Institutefor Security & Development
Policy, p. 10.
36 IFAD, the Impact of the Shift from Central Planning to the Market Economy on Livestock Systems in
Asia and Eastern European Countries: the Experience of IFAD Ex Post and Ex Ante Transition, 3.1.4 Viet
Nam, Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from
http://www.ifad.org/lrkm/theme/husbandry/pi/impact 3.htm#vietnam
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development. Longer land-use rights would provide incentive to develop private plots
over time and improve land quality and production."
2) There are still unclear definitions on land tenure, which increases contested land rights
and casts a skeptical light on land-use planning. The government should make clear
definition that would correct such issues on land rights.38
3) The implementation of rural programs is slow and expensive particularly in the remote
regions. One exacerbating factor in this sluggish implementation is relatively the tiny
budget for rural programs. For example, the government allocates only USD 85 million
for NTP-NRD, a sum that is barely suitable for pilot programs in the communes.
4) The prevalent lack of resources, facilities, and access to service in the rural sector
poses a serious challenge. This includes household labor shortages, poor access to cash
and finance facilities, low availability of livestock, and poor health and nutrition.
There is increasing inequality between the very rich and those remaining in
poverty. Doi Moi has brought transformation for many, which is attractive to foreign
investors. But as it proceeds, "the brutal inequality between urban and rural Vietnam is
bound to explode, to the despair of the Vietnamese Communist Party."4
The country is in the process of being integrated into the global economy. Vietnam is
already a leading agricultural exporter in the world, particularly in rice production. At the
same time, Vietnam has one of the highest rural population densities in the world.4'
Approximately 51 percent of the population live in poverty, and the absolute majority
" Brennan E. & Duc T.P. (2012, November 16) "Vietnam must look to rural economy", Asia Times,
Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast Asia/NK16Ae03.html
38 ibid.
" IFAD, http://www.ifad.org/lrkm/theme/husbandry/pi/impact 3.htm#vietnam
44 Escobar, P. (2003, August 15) "Vietnam: The deep end of doi moi", Asia Times, Retrieved May 1, 2013,
from http://ww w.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast Asia/EH 15Ae02.html
41 Brennan E. & Duc T.P. (2012)
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resides in the countryside.4 2 What has been missing thus far is a practicable plan to link
the rural and urban areas and perhaps design separate sub-policies for the respective
plans.
A workable rural development plan is imperative for stability and growth in
Vietnam. To this end, the government should amend existing pragmatic programs and
policy, allocate sufficient funding for rural programs, and emphasize capacity building,
empowerment of farmers through a participatory process, and diffusing new technology
and skills among farmers.
B. The Role of Foreign Aid in Vietnam
Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, Vietnam has received foreign aid
consistently; yet the amount has fluctuated depending on Vietnam's foreign relations and
political decisions. In the late 1970s, Vietnam relied heavily on economic assistance as it
was recovering from the ravages of the war. Most of assistance came from both Western
countries such as Canada, Italy, West Germany, and Soviet-bloc countries.' Foreign
assistance helped Vietnam export its oil offshore and meet balance of payment deficits.
As Vietnam developed closer ties with the Soviet Union, invasion of Cambodia and
fought a war with China in 1978 and 1979, China cut dramatic amounts of foreign aid to
Vietnam. Whereas China gave Vietnam on average USD 300 million a year, in 1979 this
sum dropped down to zero. Japan and other Western countries suspended their ODA to
Vietnam when Hanoi attacked Cambodia. Loss of foreign aid slowed the development
process in Vietnam. In particular, loss of hard currencies from the Western countries
42 Escobar (2003)
4 Federal Research Division Library of Congress, Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/vntoc.html, tinder "Foreign Economic Assistance" section
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"crippled Vietnam's ability to continue importing needed modern machinery and
technology from its Western European trading partners."" However, the Soviet Union
and its allies heavily supported Vietnam during this period. Although there is no exact
data on how much Soviet Union and other Comecon countries assisted Vietnam, the
amount is estimated between USD 0.7 and 1 billion in 1978, which is more than the total
amount of aid from the West. From 1982 to mid- 1980s, Vietnam received more than
USD 1 billion from Soviet Union, which is almost equivalent to USD 3 million per day.4 5
Substantial assistance from Moscow continued until the fall of the Soviet Union
in the early 1990s. Hence, the Soviet Union is accredited with Vietnam's modernization
and industrialization. Not only did Moscow help Vietnam with balance-of-payment
problems, but it also signed cooperation agreements for several important industrial
projects, and shared advanced technology and professional skills in various fields that
laid the fundamental infrastructure for Vietnam's development. Furthermore, in the post-
Cold War era, although the amount was significantly reduced, Vietnam continued to
receive aid from Western countries. Bilateral and multilateral aid to Vietnam grew
steadily from 1993 on. "By 1997, net loan and grants had just exceeded $700 million...
By 2000, it had doubled to $1.5 billion and was still rising."46 The top three donors during
this period were Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.4 7
Recent aid disbursement went into the field such as economic management,
development administration, human resource development, agriculture, forestry and
44Ibid.
4s Ibid.
46 Overholt, William (2011) "Park Chung Hee's International Legacy," "Senior Research Fellow", Harvard
Kennedy School Retrieved on May 1, 2013
from http://www.ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/parkjunghee.pdf, p. 1.
47 Library of Congress (2005 December), p.13 .
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fisheries, social development, health, etc. Approximately 85 percent of aid disbursement
was used to promote economic growth while aid intended for the poor or that targets
safety nets and direct transfers were significantly lower.4
Researchers like Thu Huong Le and Paul Winters discovered five reasons that
Vietnam remains poor despite its long history of receiving foreign aid":
1) Relative isolation-geographically, linguistically, socially, and intellectually
2) Inability to manage risks from natural disasters and vulnerability to price fluctuations
3) Lack of access to available resources, especially of land, technology, and useful
information
4) Inadequate participation in the planning and implementation of government programs
5) Lack of sustainability both financially and environmentally
They found that recent aid disbursements were distributed disproportionately in
view of the fact that the northern area of the country and minorities among 54 ethnic
groups were especially poorer than the rest. 50 The role of foreign aid is significant in
lifting the poor in Vietnam. Therefore, the scholars conclude that donors need to focus on
these five causes that keep the country poor and make much more efficient use of foreign
aid, if the purpose of aid is poverty reduction.
CHAPTER 5. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
My research aims at tracing the process through which the South Korean rural
development model-Saemaul Undong-has been diffused internationally. This research
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4 Le & Winters (2001), p. 14.
49 Ibid. p. 7.
50 Ibid. p.15.
paper focuses primarily on the initial stages of diffusion process, in order to link the
mechanism through which factors and actors, under what circumstances at the initial
stage, matter for a proposal to be transformed into actual international diffusion. The
main question is: Who or what determines a cross-country agreement for the international
diffusion of a rural development, and provides a contextual ground through which the
diffusion process takes place in the target host nation abroad?
Put another way, the fundamental question becomes: Why should anyone care
about who initiates or leads a cross-country agreement-either in the form of sister
municipal agreement, official development assistance, or a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)-for the international diffusion? And how does the answer to
such a question matter to stakeholders in the process, especially to the recipient
communities?
First of all, it has been often and conveniently assumed that international diffusion
practices take place homogeneously within the context of such program initiatives. As a
result, the main research questions have rather focused on the implementation and
performances of such projects in recipient communities, drawing upon statistical
significance out of a collection of sample cases. And yet, there have been only few, or a
bare minimum of in-depth studies on such diffusion practices or on the analysis of the
initial stages in the diffusion practices.
Second, within the class of apparently homogenous diffusion cases of the
Saemaul Undong across borders, I find qualitative differences in the nature of cases and
the differences emerge clearly as one investigates way in which the cases were initiated
by different types of initiators. My research focuses on three cases that are mutually
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exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Each case produces important implications on
future projections. And each suggests that there are differences in the quality of benefit
that recipient communities are expected to derive from different types of diffusion
process. Moreover, despite the increasing numbers of research projects on international
development and aid, the role of political and administrative actors in the field of local
development are not often considered in the development literature. At best, there are
rather negative references to the local politics, politicians, and bureaucrats, according to P.
McLoughlin.51
I have investigated all the relevant stakeholders in each process of Saemaul
diffusion that took place in Vietnam and it is my intention to investigate how these
stakeholders interact with initial conditions and yet also influence the process of diffusion.
Which group of actors influences the degree of the level of diffusion process, from
merely a short-term project to a sustainable development model in the host community?
From data-collection, the potential group of actors includes politicians, administrative
officials at various levels, and non-governmental agents in South Korea as well as in
Vietnam.
My main thesis question generates four plausible hypotheses regarding the roles
of major actors in the Saemaul model diffusion:
Hypothesis 1: Politicians, contrary to the common belief that their role is limited to the
rhetorical, not only initiate the sister agreement or MOU but also can make substantial
si McLoughlin, P.F.M. (1972, December) "The Farmer, the Politician, and the Bureaucrat: Local
Government and Agricultural Development in Independent Africa" African Studies Review Vol. 15, No. 3,
p. 413.
25
differences in the degree of diffusion to the extent they show continuous commitment on
the particular cases they initiated.
In this research, the term "politicians" refers to high-level officials in the national
government or, in the case of Vietnam, senior members of the Communist Party. The first
hypothesis pays attention to the role of politicians in both countries, as I have found that
several diffusion projects were initiated by politicians. In particular, I am interested to
assess whether these politicians are merely representing themselves as amicable
diplomats with no real content by only signing the MOU or agreement while not
becoming involved in the process of diffusion.
There is a report stating that despite numerous efforts by international institutions
such as the World Bank to influence Vietnamese national policies via its funds, the
socialist country has hardly been influenced by the foreign organizations. 2 Nevertheless,
Vietnam was able to attain economic success through its national policies53 rather than
ODA. In this aspect, the senior officials in the national government must have taken
active and major roles in reducing poverty, because they are the ones who develop and
implement national policy. Therefore, I pose another question: Is there observable
evidence that Vietnamese politicians tend to act as an internal policy advocacy in the
process of adopting Saemaul diffusion? If yes, has such practices borne a positive or
negative effect on the adaptation of the Saemaul Undong?
52 Cling, J., Razafindrakoto, M. Roubaurd, F. (2009, September) "Desperately seeking model countries: the
World Bank in Vietnam," DIAL working paper DT/2009-04, downloaded from www.dial.prd.fr on May 1,
2013, abstract
53 such as National Target Programme for Poverty Reduction (NTP-PR) or the P135 Programme to reduce
poverty rate, Ibid. p. 8.
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Hypothesis 2: local administrative officers in charge make substantial differences in the
degree of diffusion to the extent that they are obliged by their role assignment to remain
continuously committed to their task. Academic scholars and economists differ on their
views on the role of local administration in rural development. Peter McLoughlin argues
that those people who were involved in the planning and implementation of agricultural
projects (in Africa) view the local political and administrative scene as "disruptive, and
indeed even 'irrational."' 54 On the other hand, according to Dr. Chandrasekera
Wijayaratna, the role of local institutions is becoming more important for sustainable
rural development and realizing the integration of various rural development efforts:5
These are the driving forces that can lead to decentralization in development in any type
of government.
Therefore, it is my intention to test whether the local authorities in Vietnam in the
rural sector would be instruments to better cater to the local needs in the case of Saemaul
diffusion. Moreover, I will examine if these people are the true "insiders" who could
introduce the local issues in ways that fit the goals and procedures of reducing poverty. In
my research, these local authorities are restricted to the People's Community members at
each level-the province level, district level, and commune level.
My third hypothesis considers the role of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).56 NGOs have recently started to play essential roles in the international aid
s4 McLoughlin, (1972) p. 413.
ss edited by Wijayaratna, C.M. "Role of Local Communities and Institution in Integrated Rural
Development," (2004) Asia Productivity Organization, downloaded from http://www.apo-
tokyo.org/publications/files/pirep-icd-se-3-O1.pdf on May 1, 2013, p. 3.
56 In this research, I regard civil society organizations (CSO) as NGO as they have similar goals and
characteristics.
27
community. Many of NGOs receive official funding from the government; yet, they
remain independent of the government. In this aspect, some scholars argue that NGOs
could be more efficient providers of humanitarian services and economic development
aid than other aid sources.57 However, at the same time, these NGOs have been criticized
by their poor definition of aid, and that they focus too much on money disbursement
rather than actual improvements in the target country-"poor definition of the goals of
aid can undermine the effectiveness of foreign aid in increasing national security."58
Scott and Hopkins assert that NGOs can be more efficient than other official aid
organizations because they have the ability to convert organizational input into output
that respects the local values. 59 NGOs that are located in the target country are not only
unencumbered by the state officials, but they also have better access to information better
understanding what the target group wants and how the local system works. Therefore,
according to this view, if these NGOs were to implement local site projects, the projects
are more likely to be more efficient. However, scholars like Edwards and Hulmes claim
that this purported efficient role of NGOs has been difficult to substantiate through
empirical studies. Not only is there a lack of empirical substantiation of the efficient role
of NGOs, but there are also signs of a greater dependence of NGOs on official funding,
the latter of which would almost certainly impact those NGOs' performance in key areas,
distort their accountability, and weaken their legitimacy.60 For example, in North
57 S. McCoskey (2009, February 23) "NGOs in the Aid Community: Do Funding Source or Economic
Conditioning Matter to Decisions of Country or Activity Involvement?" the Journal of Humanitarian
Assistance, Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/381
58 Ibid
59 Scott, C.D. & Hopkins, R. (1999 May) "The Economics of Non-Governmental Organisations", the
Development Economics Discussion Paper Series, London School of Economics p. 16.
60 Edwards, M & Hulme, D. (1996, June) "Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on
nongovernmental organizations" World Development, Volume 24, Issue 6, p. 961.
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American and continental Europe, the government grants are making up between 50 to 90
percent of the major NGOs' budgets. 6' Edwards and Hulme urges that NGOs need to
"invest more in their own organizational development so that they are better able to
identify the negative impact of changes in their funding sources or role, and act
accordingly."62
There are two non-government organizations involved in the diffusion process of
the Saemaul Undong in Vietnam. One is the National Council of Saemaul Undong, one
of the oldest NGOs stationed in South Korea. The National Council of Saemaul Undong
and its Saemaul branches in smaller cities in South Korea are the major actors in the
international diffusion of the Saemaul Undong. The other NGO related in the process of
international diffusion is a branch of a South Korean NGO called "Global Civic Sharing."
Its Vietnam branch is located in Hanoi, and is called "GCS Viet-Korea Center."
In this research, I plan to test the following hypothesis on the role of NGOs in the
process of Saemaul Undong diffusion:
Hypothesis 3: Do NGOs remain independent from either government of South Korea or
Vietnam? Have the Saemaul projects led by NGOs been more efficient in terms of
addressing the needs of the Vietnamese communities than projects led by other actors?
Hypothesis 4: External factors to the Saemaul diffusion agreement-such as the similar
nature of top down system of the two countries or minor actors whose names were not
prominent in the diffusion agreement or MOU-in fact make substantial differences or
produce significant impact on the degree of diffusion.
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First, the top down system in economic development has been controversial in
academia. Some scholars, like C. Wijayaratna, argue that top down approaches adversely
affect rural development by inducing it to become "supply-driven" in many countries.63
However, there are also people who, upon observing the East Asian Miracle between the
1960s and the early 1990s, believe in the strength of having a top down system when it
comes to economic development like that in South Korea.
Some characteristics of Park Chung Hee's twenty years of dictatorship resemble
those characteristics of socialist states like Vietnam. Andrei Lankov recognizes the
similarity and states "the Saemaul Undong is eerily reminiscent of similar campaigns in
socialist countries."4 As the late President Park has been extremely controversial to
South Koreans and worldwide scholars, some also say Park's ideology, despite his
antipathy toward communism, was "far closer to the socialist, egalitarian left."65 Similar
political characteristics between South Korea during the Park era and Vietnam today
include: 1) concentrated political authority by a small and single group of politicians, 2)
centralized power prone to political repression, supported by the armed forces, 3)
bureaucracy staffed by the regime, 4) exclusive decision-making process independent of
the general public, 5) emphasis on egalitarianism that stresses equal distribution of
income and wealth, and 6) an insulated bureaucratic authority by powerful politicians.
According to Dr. Chung Ki-Hwan, a researcher at the Korea Rural Economic
Institute (KREI), the Saemaul Undong development model particularly works well in
socialist countries whilst it is relatively less effective in democratic states. This is why the
63 Wijayaratna, (2004) p. 2.
64 Lankov, A. (2010, April 16) "Saemaul Undong Sets Model for Development Countries", the Korea
Times, Retrieved on May 1, 2013 from
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/ 201 2 /03 /2 9 1 64301.html
65 Overholt (2011) p. 3 .
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South Korean government officially selected Laos and Rwanda in 2012 to pursue an
ambitious long-term project of Saemaul model diffusion. Laos and Rwanda are both a
single-party state. The conditions in both countries resemble the political atmosphere of
South Korea in the 1970s under Park Chung Hee's military dictatorship. However, any
concrete evidence that Saemaul diffusion works better in socialist countries is hard to
come by. For obvious reasons, this is not stated in the Saemaul diffusion initial agreement
or MOU.
Therefore, in this research, I would like to test whether having similar political
characteristics make a difference in the degree of Saemaul diffusion.
Second, there are actors whose roles were less emphasized in the Saemaul
diffusion agreement, yet may take major role in the diffusion process. These actors
include independent researchers in South Korea (KREI), in Vietnam (National Institute of
Agricultural Planning and Projection, or NIAPP), professional intellectuals in South
Korea, as well as parents, teachers, doctors, and nurses in Vietnam. In this research, I
intend to test whether these minor actors-whose names do not tend to appear in the
Saemaul diffusion agreement-played noticeable or even major role in the degree of
diffusion.
Methodology
According to A. Bennett and J. Checkel, process tracing is "the analysis of
evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the
purpose of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might
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causally explain the case." 66 Or, to put it simply, it is about the examination of
intermediate steps in a process to make inferences on the hypotheses on how the process
took place, and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest.67 It not only
analyzes the micro-level (individual) of decision making, but it can also be used to make
inferences on structural or macro-level explanation of historical cases .61 Process tracing
can make use of histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to
observe evidence of the causal process of a hypothesized theory and an implication in the
sequence. George and Bennett give a good example of process tracing metaphor in their
book:
If one had a row of fifty dominoes lying on the table after they had previously
been standing, how could one make inferences about whether the first
domino caused the last to fall through a 'domino process', or whether wind,
a bump of the table, or some other forces caused the dominoes to fall?6 9
The authors stress the importance of examining close-up evidence on the intervening
processes of each alternative explanation, because these fallen dominoes can be caused
by unspecified independent variables in the initial condition such as spaces between
dominoes, the possibility of the table shaking, or wind blowing them over.
Not only is there no study on interaction among stakeholders and shifts of power
in the diffusion stage of the Saemaul Undong, but these critical matters are not always
well explained by existing theories. Therefore, in this research, process tracing takes
through inductive study. This involves "analyzing events backward through time from the
66 Bennett A. & Checkel J.T. (2012) Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best
Practices, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, School for International
Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC. p. 9.
67 Ibid. p. 7.68
68 George, A.L & Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 142 & 214.
69 Bennett & Checkel (2012) p. 7.
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outcome of interest to potential antecedent causes, much as a homicide detective might
start by trying to piece together the last few hours or days in the life of a victim."70 This
involves taking a lot of information throughout tracing the process that later may or may
not become important and become part of hypothesized explanation.
There are limitations on process tracing as a methodology. It should be noted that
because causal mechanisms are operationalized in specific cases, one should avoid from
making generalization from this. In other words, the actors or institutions that took more
influential roles in the diffusion of Saemaul Undong in Vietnam may not explain the
success or the lack thereof when it comes to Saemaul programs elsewhere. Moreover,
evidence that is not available at the time of the research would lower the probability of
true causal explanation. What one can do in this case is "to predict what the unavailable
evidence will indicate once it becomes available... [because] such predictions, if borne
out, [would] provide strong confirmatory evidence"" Another element that would lower
the probability of true causal explanation is any evidence that contradicts the process
tracing prediction of explanation. In this case, the explanation may have to be modified
once the evidence becomes convincing in other set of predictions. This modification may
be serious or trivial, and one needs to generate and test the modified implication if this is
too serious.
The purpose of process tracing is not simply a detailed description of a sequence
of events or to uncover what has been done or what the performances were. Rather, the
research aims to trace the process through which primary data can be constructed on the
actual steps of decision-making involving a proposal until its actual implementation.
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Process tracing is a key technique for capturing causal mechanisms in action. The
interactions across actors and shifts of power across institutions is traced and analyzed for
each case, thus revealing a mechanism through how diffusion took place.
Tracing multiple cases with important differences allows comparative studies of
cases, throwing light on the allegedly homogeneous set of diffusion practices. My
research intends to add rich color to the literature on how diffusion actually takes place at
the practical down-to-earth level, and varies in the early stage, by processing the traces of
diffusion in depth. It also investigates further why variations occur within the apparently
homogeneous cases under the same program. Those variations would not reveal
themselves unless the process-tracing method is applied to the initial stages of diffusion
cases.
This research, if properly done, can spur actual policy debates among the
practitioners of Saemaul Undong and can throw light on the literature on the neglected
importance of investigating the initial stages of diffusion practices. Additionally, this
research can add rich texture and color to the less-known details of cases in the process
studies with emphasis on the initial stage dynamics of stakeholders in the international
diffusion practices of aid programs.
What follows is a brief description of how the Saemaul Undong played a key role
in the rural development process in South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s.
CHAPTER 6. SAEMAUL UNDONG IN SOUTH KOREA: 1970-1979
Before President Park Chung Hee launched the Saemaul Undong on April 22,
1970, a comprehensive land reform of 1948 was the only policy that critically addressed
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rural sector development.72 In the aftermath of the end of the Korean War, 1950-1953,
South Korea achieved moderate success through two "five-year economic plans," which
sought export-oriented industrialization. But the plans mostly addressed the urban sector.
The countryside remained neglected. Hence, the living standard gap between the rural
and the urban sectors steadily increased. Between 1964 and 1970, Korea's economy grew
at an overall annual rate of 10 percent, in which the non-agricultural sector contributed
14.5 percent, whereas the agricultural sector did only at 2.8 percent."
Upon taking power in 1961, Park realized that there could be no national
development without improvement of the farming villages. Park believed that the
growing income and environmental disparities between the rural and urban areas and the
ever-increasing labor shift from the farming villages to the industrialized urban cities
would not be sustainable. Therefore, in order to address these problems, Park designed
the Saemaul Undong model, in particular, with the following goals in mind: 1) to help the
rural sector to catch up by raising the living standard of the rural communities and thus
balance economic growth among different sectors, 2) to slow down urban migration, 3) to
solve the growing food supply problem, and 4) to respond to the rising political
opposition among the rural population.74 In other words, Park planned the Saemaul
Undong, conceived at first as a community-level program, which would be driven on the
residents' spirit of self-help, diligence, and cooperation, rather than solely relying on
government support.
For the first four years (or the first stage) of the Saemaul Undong, Park Chung
Hee focused on three different projects. In descending order of importance, these are: 1)
72 Reed (2010) p. 2.
' Ibid.
74Ibid. pp. 2-3.
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to improve the living environment, 2) to increase household income, and 3) to change the
attitudes of the people.
With the view toward achieving identifiable and visible changes, the government
issued working guidelines for "10 Projects for Constructing Better Villages." The
government freely distributed 335 sacks of cement to each of 33,267 villages in the
countryside. It suggested new projects such as paving and widening roads, building new
roofs, fences, and public wells, local river maintenance projects, and building small
bridges. In other words, instituting new projects that the local residents could perform by
themselves without extensive support from the government.75
After one year, government evaluations were carried out. They showed that
almost half of the villages-approximately 16,600 villages-had exceeded the program's
expectations. Buoyed by the apparent success, the government designated these villages
as "predominant villages" and provided additional 500 sacks of cement and 1 ton of
reinforcing rod for further environment improvement. This was a vital strategy that
motivated the people to advance themselves further and even create competitiveness
within villages. In this new round of "self-help" campaign, the villages developed with
blinding speed with modern tiles and cement walls. New bridges were built above the
streams. The second project focused on raising agricultural income by implementing
agricultural roads expansion, agricultural land and seed improvement, and labor sharing
among farmers.76 Lastly, Saemaul Undong focused on changing the people's attitudes on
development. Park Chung Hee made an effort to inculcate in the people a "can-do" spirit.
He remarked, "As the features of the villages improved day by day, the resident became
75 Saemaul Undong in Korea (handbook) Received from Director Ahn, Chul-kyoon of National Council of
Saemaul Undong, pp. 3-12.
76 Ibid. p. 11.
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much more confidant in the belief that 'I can do it' and 'If I do it, then we can achieve
anything."'7 In an attempt to instill a spirit of independence and also to prevent
corruption, Park exhorted his fellow Koreans, as the former Korean monarchs would his
subjects, to change undesirable mentality and attitudes, rid themselves of decadent and or
wasteful social customs, promote a diligent and frugal lifestyle, and build a cooperative
environment.7 8 Moreover, Park established the Training Institute for Saemaul Leaders at
the local level, which sought to promote these new values, organization and manpower,
and ultimately sought to cultivate leadership.
The second stage of the Saemaul Undong fueled the expansion of the campaign.
Initial success from the pilot stage gave Park a powerful incentive to further the
movement. The priorities of the movement shifted in the second phase heavily to income-
raising projects, attitude reform programs, and living environment improvement projects.
To accelerate income generation, projects such as "straightening raised footpaths between
rice fields, streamlining small rivers, pursuing combined farming, operating common
workplaces, and identifying extra income sources other than farming"79 came to be
included. Moreover, much effort went into "rationalizing" public thinking and attitudes
through public education and public relations activities. Saemaul centers within villages,
large-scale training, seminar and workshops were created to teach the Saemaul spirit-
diligence, cooperation, and self-reliance-as well as to train capacity-building and
institutional-building. Local Saemaul leaders were encouraged to share their practical
experiences, skills, and knowledge with other neighborhoods. More than 500,000 people
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were trained between 1972 and 1980. During this time, the most noticeable change was
increased income and changed attitudes. The people became more confident with
increased income, improved facilities, and better living conditions-the fruits of their
own labor. As the apparent success of the movement became more visible, urban
residents also came to pay attention to the success of the agricultural sector. And the
government's belief in the necessity of the Saemaul Undong expanding as a pan-national
campaign grew stronger.
The third stage of the Saemaul Undong focused on qualitative expansion and
building a "New Village identity," that is, growing the hitherto rural-centered
development plan to a nationwide campaign with broad participation. The movement
focused on expanding the basic unit of implementation and scope of projects to overcome
limitation of using villages as its basic unit. At the same time, the Saemaul Undong
objectives for the rural sector were kept differently from those for the urban areas. In the
rural sector, there was an effort to increase household income with non-agricultural
sources of income. Therefore, Saemaul factories and industrial park that combined
agriculture and manufacturing were established in rural areas. On the other hand, in the
urban sector, the Saemaul Undong focused on material conservation, productivity
increase, and healthier labor relations. Overall, the implementation of the projects was
now in larger units by developing linkages among the several villages in the same
region.'0
Through Stages IV and V of the movement, the Saemaul Undong underwent
fundamental change. It transformed itself from a government-initiated and supported
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movement to more a private sector movement. Consequently, a division of roles between
the government and private sectors became more distinct. The effort to clean the
environment and cultivate better community continued in these latter phases, with stress
on order, selflessness, kindness, and cooperation. But the purviews of the Saemaul
Undong also expanded to building cultural centers and other public facilities such as
credit union activities. In short, the movement became less and less rural-centric and
spread more and more across sectors and the nation at large.
Throughout the entire decade of the 1970s, the Saemaul Undong improved the
living conditions and environment of the rural and urban areas alike. Average rural
household income increased eight-fold between 1970 and 1979,81 even at one point, in
1975, exceeding that of urban households.
Comparison of per capita rural income with urban income (in USD)
YEAR URBAN HOUSEHOLD RURAL HOUSEHOLD
1963 10.95 13.69
1965 14.60 16.42
1970 50.18 39.23
1975 127.74 141.42
1980 509.12 480.84
(Source: Park, Sooyoung. "Analysis of Saemaul Undong: a Korean Rural Development Programme in
the 1970s", Asia Pacific Development Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, December 2009)
This was due to various income generation projects, introducing agricultural
technologies, and the government supporting the agricultural household by fully
protecting the domestic agricultural goods against imports, and buying the domestic
8 Park, S. (2009, December) "Analysis of Saemaul Undong: a Korean Rural Development Programme in
the 1970s" Asia Pacific Development Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 118.
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goods at higher prices.12 People, especially in the rural sector, experienced attitudinal
change with increased self-esteem and pride at what they had achieved through "the
Saemaul Spirit: diligence, self-help, cooperation." Building on the rural sector's capacity
was also facilitated by continuous Saemaul training and education.
In sum, there were many critical elements to the success of the Saemaul Undong. They
are:
1) The national government's strong commitment and leadership: It has been argued
that no programs can be successfully implemented without the commitment of the
leader. This strong commitment and leadership has been demonstrated through
President Park Chung Hee, as he initiated, planned, and provided continuous
support for the Saemaul Undong, not to mention made the Saemaul Undong a top
priority of all the government agenda at this time:
A strong commitment from the top leader
enabled effective vertical integration, linking all
the levels of government, and created a holistic
approach horizontally, mobilizing resources and
coordinating plans among the relevant ministries. 3
According to Sooyoung Park, President Park was deeply invested in the
movement. For example, Park personally checked the monthly progress report of
the Saemaul Undong, invited villagers to cabinet meetings and presented his own
ideology of "Saemaul" (New Village), and made surprise visits to villages and
training centers for moral support and encouragement.84
82 Reed (2010), p. 2. WTO laws may deter the implementation of such measures today.
83 Park (2009) p. 127.
84
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2) The grassroots' active participation: No program would be sustainable if it did not
involve the local people-or the direct beneficiaries. The distinctive
characteristics of the Saemaul Undong were that the citizens' participation was
surprisingly voluntarily and their process was ironically democratic-despite
being enacted under a military regime. No one forced anything on anyone. Rather,
peer pressure born of visible transformation in other villages -becoming modern
and clean, where neighbors live in far better conditions-pushed villagers to join
the movement. People chose their village Saemaul leaders and also chose what to
do with the raw materials provided by the government. In sum, the villages were
changing according to the vision and hard work of the residents themselves, not
by the dictate of the government.
3) Training and education: The Saemaul training had three components-cultivating
leadership, teaching the Saemaul spirit, and practical and experience-based
training. Saemaul leader was selected in each village, district, and province, from
both genders. The leaders were chosen on a strictly voluntary basis. Therefore,
they tended to be motivated, selflessness, dedicated, and prone to guiding their
fellow residents in the right direction. The Saemaul spirit-diligence, self-help,
and cooperation-was important to rally the spirit of the farmers. It was the
Saemaul leaders' role to stimulate this spirit throughout the village. In the end, the
Saemaul Undong was about bringing people together in a march toward a better
life. Finally, successful experiences and new techniques from neighborhood
villages were shared among the leaders. Not only would the village leaders share
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their experiences with their fellow villagers, but also with residents and local
leaders in other villages.
4) The social and political conditions necessary for such a program: The Saemaul
Undong was launched at the right time. The Korean War had brought tremendous
economic, social, cultural, and political destruction to both Koreas. South
Koreans, suffering from acute poverty, were desperate to live better. Prospects for
the agricultural sector looked gloomy, when government investment was almost
solely focused in the urban area in the 1960s. Under such strains, the military
leadership could conceivably have faced a coup or political upheaval itself if it
continued to neglect the rural sector and the struggling farmers.
It is often said that the Saemaul Undong played a key role in South Korea's economy
as a national campaign, until the advent of the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.
However, the focus of this paper is on the earlier stages of the Saemaul Undong, the
developmental process of the rural sector, where success is most visible. Moreover, this
developmental stage is what other developing countries aim to learn and emulate. Today,
the Saemaul Undong is operated by the National Council of Saemaul Undong, one of the
oldest NGOs in South Korea.
There is no doubt, in spite of controversial views on the late Park Chung Hee, that the
Saemaul Undong played a pivotal role in developing South Korea's countryside as well
as modernizing the whole nation. Today, more than 50,000 people from 84 countries
have visited South Korea to learn how the country transformed itself through the Saemaul
Undong. I will now turn to how the Saemaul Undong was diffused to Vietnam.
42
CHAPTER 7. SAEMAUL UNDONG AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The Saemaul Undong has long become a national badge of honor in South Korea.
Its impact on rural development is virtually unquestioned today. However, the
international diffusion of the Saemaul Undong by the South Korean government has been
met with inconsistent results. This may be due the controversial legacy of President Park
Chung Hee, who initiated the movement in the early 1970s. Park still today evokes
contradictory images, those between a "visionary leader who brought South Korea out of
poverty" and "the nation's history of harsh dictatorship."" This may suggest that South
Koreans who remain unfavorably disposed President Park, once they gained power, were
reluctant to promote the virtues of the Saemaul Movement abroad. Indeed, during the
decade between the late 1990s and 2000s when the South Korean government was led by
the center-left liberal party, no effort to actively promote the Saemaul Undong abroad
was made. In fact, during this period the government even erased the name of "Saemaul
Undong" in official documents on foreign aid and ODA.86
Nevertheless, as described in the previous chapter, the Saemaul Undong is widely
considered as a successful development model that significantly reduced poverty and
empowered the people in the rural sector in South Korea. Through "an organic
connection of enthusiastic participation of farmers (from 34,000 villages) and
government support," 7 the movement brought tremendous change to South Korea's
85 Borowiec, S. (2013, March 2) "The conflicted legacy of Park Chung-hee", Asia Times. Retrieved on
May 17, 2013, from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South Asia/NC02Df01.html
86 The interviewees requested to remain anonymous.
87 UNESCO (2012) "the Archives of Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement)" International
Memory of the World Register, Retrieved on May 1, 2013,
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underdeveloped rural sector. Over the past two decades, the model has been drawing
attention from the international community.
Today, the Saemaul Undong model is diffused to developing as well as the least
developed countries through three distributional channels-one directly from the
Saemaul Undong NGO offices in South Korea, another from a branch of the South
Korean government that handles grant-type of aid and technical cooperation, called
Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). The third channel, which is marginal,
is the provincial governments.
Distributional Channel 1: Saemaul Undong NGO offices in South Korea
Having been transformed into a non-governmental organization, Saemaul Undong
offices are located in every province-level, city-level, and county-level region throughout
South Korea, under the umbrella of the National Council of Saemaul Undong, whose
headquarter is located in the capital, Seoul. Each branch office is self-sufficiently funded
and works independently. The funding comes from individual donation and/or sometimes
partially from the national budget. 8 While the range of activities of the Saemaul Undong
differs in every branch office, the Saemaul branch in the city of Gumi and in North
Gyeongsang Province are considered as two of the most active offices promoting the
Saemaul Undong both domestically and internationally. Although the city of Gumi is
located in North Gyeongsang Province, both offices practice Saemaul Undong separately,
as they proudly consider themselves as the late President Park Chung Hee's hometown.
These NGO offices started diffusion of Saemaul Undong as early as 1992 in China,
from http://ww w.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/mow/nominiationforms/republi
c _of _koreaarchivesofsaemaul_undong.pdf, p. 6.
88 In case of large-scale projects, mostly in the international level.
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independent of the government."9 The National Council of Saemaul Undong has joined
other multilateral institutions for further diffusion of the model-tUN DPI (Department of
Public Information) in 2000 and UN ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) in 2002,90
for further cooperation, exchange, and contribution to the recipient communities.9' In
2004, the organization was conjoined by the UN ESCAP (Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific) to diffuse the methodology in developing countries
such as Nepal, Cambodia, and Laos.92 Annually, the National Council of Saemaul
Undong invites about 200 personnel from twenty countries and establishes approximately
15 villages in eight countries.93
Distributional Channel 2: National Governmental ODA via KOICA
The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) is a branch of South
Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This public entity was established in 1991
with the view toward enhancing the effectiveness of South Korea's grant aid programs
and technical cooperation in developing countries. Vietnam was selected as the first
recipient, and KOICA has led one Saemaul Undong project, which was from 2001 to
2003. KOICA has an advantage in leading Saemaul Undong projects because it has onsite
offices with resident representatives in many developing countries. Hence, KOICA can
89 Jae-sung, Hwang (2006, June 16) "11 Al}& 17" (Why Saemaul Undong: the city of Gumi as the
leader of globalization), iMaeil Newspaper, Retrieved on May 1, 2013,
from http://www.imaeil.com/sub news/sub news view.php?news id=26499&yy=2006
90 United Nations Forum on Forests (2002, November 1) "NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC"
Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from http://www.un.org/esa/forests/pdf/ecosoc accredited ngos.pdf
91 The National Council of Saemaul Undong Movement in Korea, How to Develop Our Village and
County: Handbookfor Saemaul Undong Movement, a handbook received from Director Ahn, Chul-kyoon
of National Council of Saemaul Undong on January 21, 2013, p. 16.
92 Lim, K. (2011, November) "How to cultivate and Develop Global Saemaul Undong Model Village",
i -1 7/ 5 / & / 23 -, 4/4 p. 96.
93 Limn (2011) p.97
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create and conduct localized educational program, provide medical and technical
services, and monitor each progress.94 In 2012, KOICA and the National Council of
Saemaul Undong reached a MOU to strengthen their overseas practice on Saemaul
Undong training and volunteer works.95 As of today, many Saemaul Undong projects
jointly led by KOICA and Saemaul Undong NGOs are gaining momentum in Ethiopia,
Tanzania, Rwanda, Nepal, Pakistan, Bolivia and other developing countries. At the end
of 2011, South Korean Prime Minister Kim Hwang-sik announced that his office would
lead Saemaul Undong ODA and formed a Task Force that combined 11 different
ministries and organizations" for holistic and systematic approach to global Saemaul
Undong practice. By dividing the diffusion process among different department with
expertise, South Korea is better positioned to reduce the ongoing inefficiency of
redundant aid, smaller-scaled projects, and the lack of follow-ups.
Distributional Channel 3: Provincial Governments' Activities
There are few provinces in South Korea that practice Saemaul Undong
worldwide. These provincial activities are formed through sisterhood agreements
between the host and recipient provinces. As of today, nine Saemaul projects have been
conducted in Vietnam by four provinces in South Korea. These are separate from
94 the Guardian reporter (2013, March 1)"KOICA volunteers build "Saemaul" community hall for Z'bari
villagers", IPP Media, Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?1=51819
95 "Al 0o51-A1/201 - t 9 As x1 _N q " (KOICA and National Council of Saemaul Undong collaborate on
international activities) Hankyung Newspaper (2012, August 7) Retrieved on May 1, 2013
from http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2012080730761
96 including Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Security and Public
Administration, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Ministry of Health and Welfare,
KOICA, and National Council of Saemaul Undong, according to: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, (2011,
November 12) " 1, ql 0} 'Al} ]- ' 8 A d 9" (the Government diffuses Saemaul Undong model
to Myanmar), Korean Policy Portal, Retrieved on May 1, 2013,
from http://www.korea.kr/policy/economyView.do?newsld=148752567&call from=naver news
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Saemaul NGO works because the projects were funded by the South Korean provincial
government budget, while Saemaul NGO personnel may participate voluntarily. Saemaul
Undong practices are usually led by governors who believe in the Saemaul Undong as
successful rural development model. The most prominent Saemaul Undong activities are
undertaken by the North Gyeongsang Province of South Korea, Gyeongsangbukdo. This
province was the center of the Saemaul Undong in 1970s as well as the birthplace of the
movement's initiator, the late President Park Chung Hee. Gyeongsangbukdo launched
South Korea's first international diffusion practice to Vietnam in 2001.
CHAPTER 8. SAEMAUL UNDONG IN VIETNAM & CASE SELECTION
Although the political system and the level of economic development may be
significantly different, South Korea and Vietnam share many similarities in both
historical and social context. Both countries experienced direct colonization before World
War II-South Korea by Japan, and Vietnam by France. They both experienced internal
war that quickly grew into a major international war-Korean War (1950 - 1953) and
Vietnam War (1955 - 1975), respectively. While the two Koreas still remain divided at
the 3 8th parallel, Vietnam was also once divided by a provisional demarcation between
the North and South at the 17 h parallel (in the Geneva Conference of 1954). South Korea,
as one of the world's poorest countries in the aftermath of the Korean War, received
enormous aid from the U.S., multilateral institutions and bilateral organizations to rebuild
its demolished infrastructure. In slightly more than a generation, South Korea officially
transformed itself into a democratic state with a dynamic economy. Moreover, South
Korea adopted the Japanese economic development model, that of its despised former
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colonial master, which advanced South Korea's economic status rapidly. Today, South
Korea has the world's 15th largest economy.97
In contrast, Vietnam experienced longer colonization and a war that lasted more
than two decades. It was eventually unified in 1975, but under a communist system.
Vietnam has suffered longer than South Korea in terms of warfare, which means the
conditions for rebuilding its tattered infrastructure have been more challenging.
Moreover, South Korea dispatched combat troops during the Vietnam War and fight
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi) alongside the U.S. South Korea
established diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1992 and opened an Embassy in Hanoi
for the first time. 98 Since then, South Korea has played an important role in Vietnam's
economic progress.99 South Korea currently accounts for the third largest Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in Vietnam with annual investment of USD 480.8 million. 00 As South
Korea is now "Asia's fourth-largest economy,"10' which is all more remarkable
considering that the nation has built its economy from the ashes of the Korean War.
Vietnam recognizes South Korea as a post-war success story and seeks to learn from its
development model. While Vietnam is experiencing rapid industrialization and
97 According to the statistical data by the United Nations, data downloaded from
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnItransfer.asp?flD=2
98 South Korea withdrew its Embassy in Saigon in the early 1970s.
99 "South Korea plays key role in Vietnam's economy", Yonhap News, (2012, December 17) Retrieved on
May 1, 2013,
from http://english.Vonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/12/17/98/030 1000000AEN20121217004600320F.HT
ML
100 Wu, Jeffrey (2013, January 20) "Taiwan lags behind Japan, South Korea in Vietnam investment:
envoy", Focus Taiwan News Channel, Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201301200 0 09 .aspx
101 Yonhap News (2012, December 17)
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modernization, agriculture still plays a major role in the national economy-the
contribution of agricultural sector to GDP is about 30 to 40 percent."
Vietnam showed little interest in the Saemaul Undong until then-Prime Minister
Do Muoi visited South Korea for the first time in 1995. This was a period of significant
domestic and international change. Vietnam had some ten years of experience with Doi
Moi, the economic reforms that had been introduced in 1986. Agricultural policy reforms
had begun in 1988. And the Cold War had ended five years before in short, the
circumstances were conducive to seeking new ideas and models of development.
Prime Minister Do Muoi personally requested that he be led on a visit to
successful Saemaul Undong sites. He made an unanticipated visit to North Gyeongsang
province." He saw for himself how this rural province had built socio-economic
infrastructure through the Saemaul Undong in the 1970s. He also saw similar elements of
the rural sectors of South Korea in the 1970s and Vietnam in the 1990s. Later, he
requested that the Saemaul Undong be taught to Vietnamese officials and planned for a
bilateral pilot project in Vietnam.
According to Dr. Vu Cong Lan, the head researcher of the National Institute of
Agricultural Planning and Projection (NIAPP)," Vietnamese first heard about the
success of South Korea's Saemaul Undong through radio and newspapers in 1994. In
1998, Vietnamese high-ranking officials from the Policy Department (and other
departments) proposed a pilot program to South Korea's KOICA office in Vietnam. The
102 edited by Wijayaratna (2004), p. 24.
103 Park, Woon-young (1995, April 14) "1]2 *l 7] A , ~1t'" (Vietnam's Prime Minister would
like to see South Korea's agricultural sector) Retrieved on May 1, 2013,
from http://news.naver.com/main/read .nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=001&aid=0004014486
1 National Institute of Agricultural Planning and Projection (NIAPP) is an independent research
institution that has partnership with the National Government of Vietnam for policy-making research.
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following year, KOICA approved it. The first Saemaul Undong diffusion began in 2001
through a two-year pilot program by KOICA and the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural
Development (MARD). However, from a NGO perspective, Saemaul Undong pilot
projects in Vietnam started earlier than the official KOICA program. For example, in
1999, the National Council of Saemaul Undong initiated the first pilot program in three
villages in Ha Tray Province and built a kindergarten, health center, and paved 1.3km of
road in two years. In other words, Vietnam today has nearly 15 years of experience with
the Saemaul model.
Case Selection
I chose Vietnam as my case study because I was searching for a recipient country that
has a relatively long history with the Saemaul Undong, in order to be able to trace
process the case in detail from a pool of various projects. This would allow me to
compare and contrast the different developmental processes of various Saemaul projects.
I made contacts and collected initial data of Saemaul Undong in Vietnam from October
of 2012 to January of 2013, from research in the United States and South Korea. There
were many challenges in collecting data out of the country. I was not able to find any
detailed description besides few newspaper articles and few reports online. Saemaul
projects in Vietnam are relatively older than other countries like nations in Africa, so
people who were once involved in the project are either retired or they fall in the
generation of not active email users. Moreover, contacting personnel through
international call was not effective, due to 14-hour difference between Seoul and Boston.
I was only able to collect all the information about Vietnam project once I arrived in
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Seoul for 10 days. I went to the National Council of Saemaul Undong to collect data in
person. Due to the administrative rigidity in Vietnam, I asked the officials from the
National Council of Saemaul Undong to provide focal contacts, and build up further
contacts and rapports once I was in Vietnam. From collecting all kinds of Saemaul
projects in Vietnam'05,I was able to learn that within the class of apparently homogenous
diffusion cases of Saemaul Undong, qualitative differences in the nature of the cases
existed. The differences emerge clearly as one investigates ways in which the cases were
initiated by or took the most active role by different types of actors.
This paper examines three cases in mutually exclusive but collectively exhaustive
ways, so that neither the selection nor the collection of cases is random but structured in a
comprehensive way to encapsulate all possible kinds of cases in the diffusion initiatives
of the Saemaul Undong in Vietnam. By type, a particular case generates important
implications and quality differences in the assumption that recipient communities are
expected to benefit from different types of diffusion processes. For example:
1) The first case is that sought by the national government of Vietnam, the recipient
country. The Vietnamese government took the leading role to adopt the Saemaul
Undong model. The best illustrative example of this is the Saemaul project in
Khoi Ky village. I will hereafter call this case the "Khoi Ky" Project.
2) The second case is that proposed by the donor country-the Saemaul NGO in
South Korea. The best example of this is the project undertaken by Saemaul NGO
office in Gumi city of Gyeongsangbuk province. The recipient commune in
10s As of today, there are 31 Saemaul projects done in Vietnam: Refer to Table 1 in Tables and Figures
section.
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Vietnam is called Lien Phuong. Therefore, I will call this case the "Lien Phuong"
Project.
3) The third case is that proposed by both donor and recipient countries. It is a
project based on a province-to-province MOU, a bilateral agreement. The project
has been carried out with equal contribution from both sides. One example of this
is a Saemaul project in La Bang village. From now on, I will call this the "La
Bang" Project.
In next chapter, I will discuss about the methodology I am going to use in this research
and hypotheses to test, based on existing literature and common knowledge.
CHAPTER 9. CASE 1: THE KHOI KY PROJECT
The Khoi Ky Project is considered the first Saemaul project in Vietnam. It was
first proposed in 1998 and was implemented in 2001 for two years. It is the only
government-to-government agreement to launch a pilot program in two Vietnamese
villages-the Khoi Ky and Vihn Tranh communes. As it has been proposed and initiated
from the national government of Vietnam, it is officially categorized as a Vietnamese
project rather than South Korean KOICA project or ODA."*
I plan to examine only the Khoi Ky commune because of its location near Hanoi.
The Khoi Ky commune is located in the Dai Tu district of Thai Nguyen province. It is
approximately 150 km north of Hanoi. The Khoi Ky commune is composed of six
villages with a total population of 1,900. The area heavily relies on local agricultural
production, mainly rice and tea leaves, but also peanuts and corns. Annual production of
106
KOICA, (2003) "e7o1 4 A1 - LAi" (Final report and assessment on the agricultural
development pilot project in Vietnam), received from Dr. Chung of KREI on February 2, 2013, p. 619.
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rice is 3.8 tons/ha and tea is I ton/ha. The average household income was USD 366 a
year before the pilot project.'
[Map: Khoi Ky, Dai Tu district, Thai Nguyen province, Vietnam)
O tgp That Ng Zne, Vietna
Nat iaTtial
Mih Phu I i"l
There were two main purposes to this project: 1) to test Saemaul Undong's
transferability in Vietnam'0 " and 2) to use the data from this project to formulate a
national policy for the agricultural sector, as Saemaul Undong has been considered as an
alternative model for rural development in Vietnam.' 09
Below is a list of actors and organizations that officially participated in this
Saemaul project:
From Vietnam:
- Ministry of Planning and Investment
- Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)
107 Ibid.
Chung, Ki Whan KREI, Personal Interview, on February 2, 2013
109 Lan, Vu Cong, "Head of International Cooperation and Project Management Division of NIAPP",
Personal interview, January 30, 2013
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- National Institute for Agricultural Planning and Projection (NIAPP)
- Local governments including province government and district government
- People's Committee members from province level, district level, and commune
level
- Villagers
From South Korea:
- Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), part of Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade
- Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI)
The project consisted of two parts"': 1) construction of infrastructures and diffusing
advanced agricultural technology to improve living standards and to increase household
income and 2) training and education via dispatching Saemaul specialist to Vietnam, and
also inviting Vietnamese to South Korea to teach how the Saemaul Undong can be
applied in the Vietnamese context, while also providing vocational training for villagers.
The Saemaul Undong in South Korea not only involved continuous support of the central
government, but also villagers contributed a portion of their earnings to the movement,
thereby developing a sense of ownership of the project. Having the feeling of ownership
and contributing physical and capital investment to the project increases responsibility
thereby making the project sustainable. Seeing this importance, KOICA demanded that
not only should the Vietnamese government take part in this Saemaul project, but
villagers, too, should also contribute in this project. Below is a more detailed description
of each project:
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110 KOICA, (2003), p. 622.
[Financial Input in Khoi Ky Project in 2001-2002, UNIT: USD]"I'
PROJECT (PLANNED) KOICA VN COMMUN TOTAL
GOVT E
I. Infrastructure Building 29,113 45,642 34,743 109,498
Dike
Canal
Road
II. Community Building 15,533 3,866 19,399
Community Centers
Community beautification
Renovating village institution
III. Improve Living 15,693 6,233 21,926
Environment
Kitchen
Toilet
Bath booth
Drinking well
IV. Agricultural Development 10,000 13,968 23,968
Improving irrigation
High yielding variety
Agricultural inputs
Improve tea quality
V. Socio-cultural Development 3,300 3,300
Education
Cultural activities
VI. Health Care 600 600
First aid bags
Bicycle
VII. Training & Agricultural 9,800 9,800
Extension
TOTAL 74,239 55,442 58,810 188,491
RATIO OF ACTUAL TO 110.5% 65.0% 87.7%
PLANNED INPUT
Although the Saemaul pilot projects had been more successful in the Vihn Tranh
commune than Khoi Ky" 2, still 80 to 90 percent of villagers said that the pilot project had
"IChung, Ki Whan (2012, December 20) "Saemaul Undong Modeled Pilot Project; Community-Based
Rural Development in Vietnam", p. 11. (unpublished: personally received from Dr. Chung of KREI on
February 2, 2013)
112 KOICA, (2003), p. 630.
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made a positive impact on their livelihood." 3 Physical infrastructure such as canal, dam,
and road pavement had overachieved its target because the local government prioritized
this part, as it was already one of their domestic projects in the rural sector. However, the
prioritizing of physical construction decreased the local government's financial
contribution in other areas of the Saemaul project. When I asked to visit the Khoi Ky
commune in January 2013, the local government declined my request for a site visit.
KOICA has not followed up since 2003, due to differences of interest and politics
between the two countries." 4 From interviews, it is believed that it is difficult to find any
traces of the original pilot project; therefore, I believe that this pilot program was
designed by the Vietnamese government to draft its national policy.
II. Testing the Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Politicians, unlike the common belief that their role is limited to rhetoric,
not only initiate the sister agreement or MOU but also can make substantial differences in
the degree of diffusion to the extent they show continuous commitment on the particular
cases they initiated.
Politicians in this project proved to be the almighty, holistic director, especially in
the socialist context, who direct from initiating to designing and implementing national
policy. It was not widely reported in the media, but this first Saemaul project was
initiated by former Prime Minister Do Muoi after his visit to South Korea in 1995. He
saw the resemblance between Vietnam at that time and South Korea in the 1970s, and he
113 KOICA (2003) p. 595.
"4 Choi, Su Young "Policy Advisor of KOICA", Personal interview, January 29, 2013. My reliance on
KOICA for these sources needs further third-party verification.
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promptly arranged a group of senior officials in Vietnam to appeal to South Korea for
cooperation on Saemaul Undong diffusion." 5
This is a significant step that differentiates from customary subsidy-oriented
development assistance because the main goal was to establish a ground step for current
Vietnamese National Target Programme on the New Rural Development (NTP-NRD)"6 .
NTP is a nationwide policy and targeted program and NRD is one of many focuses in
NTP that targets 2010-2020, where the national government set new standards for the
rural villages to conform to. The goals are similar to those of the Saemaul Undong in
South Korea: 1) to improve living standards and household income, 2) to conserve the
environment, 3) to educate the farmers, 4) to maintain Vietnamese cultural values, and
with additional socialist values, 5) to strengthen local officials' political competence. The
government targets 20 percent of all communes and 50 percent of all villages in Vietnam
to conform to the new rural standards by 2020." According to Dr. Vu Cong Nan at
NIAPP. without continuous effort and grave responsibilities of the former prime minister
and other senior officials at the national level, who are the driving engines of everything
in the socialist state, today's NTP-NRD would not exist.
In 2011, the direct investment capital for NTP was USD 1.3 million, of which the
national government subsidized USD 1.2 million and the local governments contributed
rs Lan, Vu Cong, "Head of International Cooperation and Project Management Division of NIAPP",
Personal interview, January 30, 2013.
116 Lan, Vu Cong, "Head of International Cooperation and Project Management Division of NIAPP",
Personal interview, January 30, 2013
117 Hoa, Thu (2012, April 12) "Vietnam's national target program on new rural development" VOV5 Radio
the Voice of Vietnam, Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from http://vovworld.vn/en-us/New-Rural-
Landscape/Vietnams-national-target-program-on-new-rural-development/ 7 8 9 3 7 .vov
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USD 130,000.118 Politicians at the national level act as a holistic tool that initiates, orders,
and determines sustainability of the Saemaul model. Vu Cong Nan even recalled the book
that was created by NIAPP and KREI on Saemaul research and evaluating the pilot
project, "the bible."
Hypothesis 2: Local administrative officers in charge make substantial differences in the
degree of diffusion to the extent that they are obliged by their role assignment to remain
continuously committed to their task.
It is necessary to compare the two pilot projects in Khoi Ky and Vihn Tranh
communes in order to examine the role of local administrative officers in the diffusion
project. In the Vihn Tranh commune, it is recorded that the local government financially
supported 102.3 percent and villagers contributed 161.7 percent in respect to its original
plan. This led the Saemaul project in this area to be overachieved with 100 percent
satisfaction from the villagers."' Nevertheless, in the Khoi Ky commune, the local
government financially supported only 65 percent and the villagers contributed only 87.7
percent relative to its original plan. KOICA assesses that this poor activity and outcome
in the Khoi Ky commune is attributed to local government officials and administrators'
bureaucratic practice and a prevailing lack of interest.12 For example, it is recorded that
the governor and vice governor of Vihn Tranh constantly visited the commune and even
actively participated in night meetings with the villagers. 12' These local governors'
enthusiasm positively influenced the villagers' attitude by setting a good model.
118 Tan, Thien (2012, July 31) "Vibrant Rural Development" Vietnam Business Forum, Retrieved on May
1, 2013, from http://vccinews.com/news detail.asp?news id=26624
119 KOICA (2003) pp. 601-602.
120 Chung, Ki Whan of KREI, Personal Interview, on February 2, 2013
121 KOICA (2003) p. 615.
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Moreover, they also let the villagers decide what to do, and empowered the villagers.
Through this process, despite the villagers in Vihn Tranh having lived in a socialist
system for years, were still able to practice a form of democratic system within
themselves and became more creative and, therefore, more involved with the Saemaul
project.
However, in the Khoi Ky commune, the traditional authoritative behavior and
lack of enthusiasm on the part of local administrators had a negative impact that actually
cut the villagers' and local government's financial and physical contribution to the pilot
project. Therefore, compared to Vihn Tranh commune, both input and output suffered.
The KOICA staff recognizes similarities in political culture between South Korea
and Vietnam at the community level, namely, that it is common to see people practice
autonomy under the guidance of a village headman. However, in a socialist country, this
power of village headman is lessened by ruling officials, such as the People's Committee
of district and province level. Hence, villagers in Vietnam are accustomed to play a
passive role in community activities. NIAPP, KOICA, and KREI officials consider Vihn
Tranh as an extraordinary case of the ruling officials showing tolerance and a progressive
attitude to the people. 2 Because of the extraordinary case of Vihn Tranh, the national
government chose it to be the role commune for local workshops, and the villagers shared
their experience with neighboring communes in 2003."3
Through this comparison, one can see a substantive difference in output
depending on how much the local authorities are obliged to involve themselves in local
activities. This variable not only affects the outcome of a project, but also the attitude of
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Ibid. p. 629.
1 Ibid. p. 633.
the direct beneficiaries. Local authorities are different from national leaders. They
directly influence and control the villagers while the national officials are focused on
more of a holistic approach such as overall consideration and making national policy. The
director of MARD emphasizes that the local authorities should rally their people to carry
out local projects even without the national government's investment.14 He should also
recognize that building the villagers' capacity is equally important and that this comes
from empowerment at the grassroots level. In sum, local authorities in this project proved
to be the determinants of the diffusion level, and the more they try to maintain their
socialist order and system at the commune level, the less they will be able to carry out
South Korea's rural development model.
Hypothesis 3, which addresses the role of NGOs in the diffusion process, will be omitted
in this chapter because there was no NGO involved in the Khoi Ky project.
Hypothesis 4: External factors to the Saemaul diffusion agreement-such as the similar
nature of top down system of the two countries or minor actors whose names were not
prominent in the diffusion agreement or MOU-in fact make substantial differences or
produce significant impact on the degree of diffusion.
Top-down politics regardless of one's political system is common in Asia. South
Korea and Vietnam-one representing democracy and the other socialism-share many
cultural, historical, and social characteristics. Because of this, both countries anticipated
Saemaul in Vietnam style-renamed as NTP-NRD-to be quite successful, despite the
different political systems. The effectiveness of the top down approach was evident just a
year after the implementation of the NTP-NRD. At the end of 2011,
124 Duong Van To's quotation from Tan (2012, July 31)
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[The] objectives of building new rural areas have been integrated into
resolutions of Party Congresses at all levels and created a movement
among the Party and people. [Moreover], the organization, apparatus,
and contingent of carders of the program have been completed from
the central to local levels and become more professional as they have
gained experience in program implementation and resource mobilization
and the picture on new areas have become clearer.12 5
The national government formulated 19 criteria on building a new rural area, each in
standardized score of living standard and income level. Its program considers farmers as
key subjects and emphasizes the community internal forces. The national government has
"pledged to stand side by side with farmers to help them throughout the process to
implement the program with a focus on financial support, production methods, and
direction for rural development."126 The Vietnamese no longer needs KOICA or KREI to
assist them as they have found their way to revitalize the agricultural sector. The list of
this 19-criteria for each commune is mounted on the wall of each community center, to
motivate each commune to reach its goal.
The minor actors-whose names were less prone to appear in the initial project
agreement-in the Saemaul pilot project are NIAPP and KREI. Both are independent
research institutions that worked in partnership with each government. They are the ones
who actually taught South Korea's Saemaul Undong to the Vietnamese, investigated the
Saemaul Undong, transformed it to fit the Vietnamese way, created the blueprint of this
pilot project, evaluated it afterwards, and designed and proposed Vietnamese national
rural policy to senior officials of the national government. Their roles and work should be
differentiated from the trainees at the Saemaul Undong training center managed by the
National Council of Saemaul Undong (NGO) in South Korea. This is one-on-one training
125 Hung, Ho Xuan (2012, March 20) "On the National Target Programme on New Rural Development"
Communist Review, Retrieved on May 1, 2013, from http://english.tapchicongsan.org.vn/Hone/Vietnam-
on-the -way-of- renovation/2012/274/On-the-National-Target-Programme-on-New-Rural-Dev elopment.aspx
126 Hoa, Thu (2012, April 12)
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between Vietnamese researchers and South Korean researchers over years. This is how
Vietnamese were able to design a customized policy and program that was very much
aided by continuous assistance from South Korean researchers.
The Khoi Ky project was a holistic approach of Saemaul Undong in Vietnam that
was originally designed to reform its national rural policy. With impressive achievements
as listed above, Vietnamese officials still need to acknowledge that the Saemaul Undong
is about "lionizing the role of the farmer and championing rural communities."127 They
need to further strengthen communication to raise this awareness and redefine the
objectives of NTP-NRD based on the villager's perspective. In sum, they should let the
people make decisions on their future.
CHAPTER 10. CASE 2: THE LIEN PHUONG PROJECT
There are numerous Saemaul diffusion projects led by South Korean non-
governmental organizations, mainly by Saemaul Undong offices-the "headquarter"
National Council of Saemaul Undong or a city branch. These projects tend to be smaller
in scale, as most of NGOs only rely on independent fundraising. On the other hand, the
National Council of Saemaul Undong and Gyeongsangbukdo (North Gyeongsang
Province) Saemaul branch, as bigger organizations, receive partial funding from the
government.
I visited the Gumi Saemaul office in South Korea in December 2012 and met
Director Chung. Thereafter I visited the Lien Phuong commune, a beneficiary commune,
and met local officers, doctors, and villagers in January 2013. The Lien Phuong
127 Brennan & Duc (2012, November 16)
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commune is in the Tuong Tin district, which is located about 35 km south of downtown
Hanoi. The local population of the district is about 208,000 in 12.7 km2 . It is comprised
of 29 small communes and villages.
[Map of Lien Phuong commune in Vietnam]
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The Lien Phuong commune received numerous Saemaul diffusion projects led by
the Saemaul office in Gumi in South Korea, as it was the first international diffusion
project undertaken by the Saemaul Gumi office, which was in 2001. Since 2001, the
Gumi Saemaul office was able to conduct the Saemaul project until 2010, almost
annually, in Lien Phuong and other neighborhood communes of Hanoi.
According to Director Chung, the main purpose of the Saemaul diffusion project
from Gumi Saemaul office is to engage in people-to-people diplomatic activities between
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Vietnam and South Korea.12' Below is a list of actors and organizations that officially
participated in this type of Saemaul project:
From Vietnam:
- Secretary of the Communist Party, Representing Hanoi
- People's Committee members from province level, district level, and commune
level
- Director of the Health Center (MD)
- Villagers
From South Korea:
- Gumi Saemaul office
- GCS Viet-Korea Cooperation Center
- Vice Mayor of Gumi city
Below is procedure of how NGO-led Saemaul diffusion is initiated:12 9
1. Gumi Saemaul contacts GCS Viet-Korea Cooperation Center once they
accumulate enough funding for an international project, and if they decide
Vietnam is an appropriate recipient country.
2. GCS Viet-Korea Cooperation Center sends a letter of notice to People's
Committee of the district level with the amount of aid.
3. People's Committee of Hanoi finds the poorest commune based on the existing
statistical data; contacts People's Committee of a chosen district (Tuong Tin).
4. The designated district level of People's Committee draws out a feasible proposal
with the available funding.
128 Chung, Dae-suk, "Director of International Division in Gumi Saemaul", Personal Interview, January 24,
2013
129 Choe, Y-Kyo, "Director of VKCC", Personal Interview, February 28, 2013
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5. The proposal requires approval signature within the People's Committee
members-from the commune level to province level.
6. The signed proposal goes to the People's Aid Coordinating Committee
(PACCOM), the government administration of international NGOs' operation
7. The signed proposal goes to Gumi Saemaul office in South Korea via GCS Viet-
Korea Cooperation Center.
8. The designated money goes directly to GCS Viet-Korea Cooperation Center and
Director Choe (of GCS) hands over the fund to the assigned commune directly.
The "processing fee" claims about 15 percent of the total fee.
9. Implementation of Saemaul diffusion project: delegation from South Korea visits
the site after the project
10. The evaluation form comes from Gumi Saemaul office to GCS; Director Choe
conducts one-time evaluation and sends the form back to Gumi.
As of today, the Gumi Saemaul office has achieved the following: established a
health center and a reading room, conducted cow banking, sent materials and
supplements to the health center and reading room several times, and invited Vietnamese
local officers and selected villagers to Gumi in South Korea for Saemaul sessions." The
Gumi Saemaul office provided 100 percent of the financing, yet it did not visit the site
during the diffusion process except in the beginning of the project to sign the MOU and
at the end of the project for a ribbon-cutting ceremony."' The villagers contributed
human labor during the construction of health center and reading room, but not
financially. The work of the villagers was calculated as labor cost and was subsidized as
financial contribution. The local government did not financially contribute in this
130 Chung, Dae-suk, "Director of International Division in Gumi Saemaul", Personal Interview, January 24,
2013
131 Choe, Y-Kyo, "Director of VKCC", Personal Interview, February 28, 2013
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project.32 They regard the Saemaul project as an aid project. From the Gumi Saemaul
office's standpoint, the target country and the contents of international projects changed
every year based on the amount of fund available for use. Therefore, this NGO-led type
of Saemaul diffusion projects remained as one-time contribution and one-time donation
of goods, without follow-ups or evaluation.
[Saemaul Project by Gumi Saemaul Office in Lien Phuong in
Project Year Project Name Budget (USD)
2001 Saemaul Health Center MOU fund 1,227
2002 Saemaul Health Center and medical supply 17,272
2003 Saemaul Reading Room 4,545
2004 Saemaul Reading Room expansion 2,272
2005 Medical supply and cow banking"14  1,818
2007 Medical and book supply 2,500
2009 Medical supply 12,318
2010 Medical supply 4,545
TOTAL 46,500
I was able to visit the health center and the reading room built by the villagers and
funded by the Gumi Saemaul office. On the other hand, visiting Vietnamese sites was
more challenging. I was required to submit an official letter of request to each commune I
planned to visit, citing legitimate reasons and submitting interview questions ahead of
32 Hanha, "People's Committee member of Lien Phuong", Personal Interview, January 29, 2013
133 Chung, Dae-suk, "Director of International Division in Gumi Saemaul", Personal Interview, January 24,
2013
14 Gumi Saemaul office or VKCC buys 30 cattle (approximately USD 400-500 per cattle) and distribute
each to a farming household and recover the amount after three years. Farmers either sell new cattle or sell
the originally received cow at this point. This is uniquely sustainable that the NGO can repeat this in a
different village every three years.
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time.135 Furthermore, as I was chaperoned by local government officials throughout my
visit, it was difficult to observe with confidence how these places operate daily. Doctors,
nurses, and children I came across were more than willing to meet and greet me.
Everything seemed to be pre-arranged to greet and welcome the outsider, especially one
from the donor country. The two-floor health center cost approximately USD 15,000 for
physical construction. The doctors said the health center is used accordingly. It is mostly
used for basic needs and for emergency such as childbirth 36 or seasonal vaccination. 37
The patients have to pay for medicine so that the health center can continue its operation.
While the local government officers knew or at least were familiar with the word
"Saemaul Undong," the villagers, children, and doctors did not know what Saemaul
Undong meant. Even those who had heard of the term believed it is a name of a donor or
sponsor from either China or South Korea. This indicated that the Saemaul Undong had
not been diffused as originally intended.
II. Testing the Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Politicians, contrary to the common belief that their role is limited to the
rhetorical, not only initiate the sister agreement or MOU but also can make substantial
differences in the degree of diffusion to the extent they show continuous commitment on
the particular cases they initiated.
In contrast to the Khoi Ky project, this NGO-led Saemaul diffusion project
received minimal intervention from politicians. Politicians from neither country chose to
take a proactive role. Nor did they play a key role in this NGO-led Saemaul diffusion
13s A 24-hour notice letter is required for foreigners to visit a specific place (such as commune/district) and
interview people in Vietnam. Also, local officers must be present with the visitor all times.
136 120 babies per year, according to a Dr. Tuyen at the health center, Personal Interview, January 29, 2013
137 Mostly students in elementary school, according to Dr. Tuyen at the health center, Personal Interview,
January 29, 2013
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project. They rather remained as rhetorical figures that visited the site before and after the
launch of the project for public relations such as the ribbon-cutting ceremony. People's
Committee members remember meeting the vice mayor of Gumi city, Mr. Nam, in the
Lien Phuong commune when Gumi Saemaul officials came to sign the MOU.13 s
Likewise, the Secretary of the Communist Party of Hanoi, Mr. Tien, visited South Korea
in 2004 upon the Gumi Saemaul office's invitation for Saemaul training sessions in Gumi
city. It may appear, at first, that these friendly gestures by politicians from both countries
have led to the building of amicable relations that facilitated the extension of the Saemaul
diffusion for almost ten years. However, through process tracing, it was determined that
the arbitrator between two countries was not a politician, but, in fact, an international
non-governmental organization located in Hanoi. This will be described in hypothesis 3
below.
Hypothesis 2: Local administrative officers in charge make substantial differences in the
degree of diffusion to the extent that they are obliged by their role assignment to remain
continuously committed to their task.
Local administration officers-People's Committee members of Hanoi, 13 9 of the Tuong
Tin district, and of the Lien Phuong commune-decide on the location and work of the
Saemaul diffusion project. They not only have the power to sign on the project proposal,
but they also can restrict the outsiders' activities-South Koreans NGOs-once they
consider third party involvement to be intrusive.
Therefore, according to Director Choe of VKCC, one of the reasons that The
Saemaul projects end as one-time donation without continuous or in-depth evaluation is
138 Hanha, "People's Committee member of Lien Phuong", Personal Interview, January 29, 2013
139 Ha Tay province has been incorporated into Hanoi.
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that the People's Committee draws an upper ceiling on the foreigners' activities. It is
these local administrators' responsibility to keep the aid project in their own hands, as the
government enforcement is vital in a socialist country.
The People's Committee heavily relies on the orders of higher officials
(especially People's Councils) as they were elected by the Councils. Local government is
used to receiving aid and they do not have further interest than the aid project itself.
Because of this responsive attitude, there is a lack of support to build autonomy among
the communities. Staff from South Korean NGOs mentioned that it is impossible to
diffuse "Saemaul" attitude in Vietnam the way it was disseminated throughout the village
population in South Korea in the 1970s." Reforming people's attitude is a sensitive step
in a socialist country as it may cause domestic revolution.
Hypothesis 3: Was the NGO-led Saemaul diffusion independent from either
government? Has the project led by NGOs been more effective in terms of addressing the
needs of Vietnamese communities than projects led by other actors?
There are two South Korean NGOs involved in this project-one is the Saemaul
Undong office in South Korea and the other one is a branch of a South Korean
international NGO named Global Civic Sharing (GCS) in Vietnam, which is called "Viet-
Korea Cooperation Center" (VKCC).
The Gumi Saemaul office is independent of the South Korean government as it
raises fund within its own district or city specifically for international Saemaul diffusion.
However, since there is no Saemaul Undong office overseas, the Gumi Saemaul office
would have to collaborate with and entrust certain responsibilities to VKCC, in view of
the lack of information as well as the language barrier.
140 The staffs requested to remain anonymous.
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GCS is a non-profit, international development organization based in South Korea
that provides development aid to disadvantaged communities in developing countries. It
stresses sustainable development through educational and technology support, rather than
fulfilling immediate needs through goods and fund.'4 1 GCS's program in Vietnam is
operated by its branch VKCC, where it focuses on capacity building through vocational
training and income generation through cow banking.14 2
According to the chairman of GCS, Mr. Kang, the range of work that GCS does in
Vietnam may overlap with the Saemaul Undong theme. However, GCS has no intention
of diffusing the Saemaul development model in Vietnam.143 However, from my
observation in Vietnam, VKCC is an influential key actor-or "the link" between
Vietnam and South Korea-in the diffusion process of the Saemaul Undong.
VKCC operates on three levels: 1) contacting Vietnamese People's Committee
once Gumi Saemaul has collected appropriate funding to initiate the Saemaul project, 2)
directly delivering money and materials from South Korea to the recipient commune in
Vietnam, 3) conducting evaluation of Saemaul project on behalf of the Gumi Saemaul
office.
The Saemaul NGOs in South Korea began to involve VKCC in their diffusion
process for transparency and efficiency. According to staffs at the VKCC, before VKCC
became involved with the Saemaul offices, the funds and donation given to Vietnam for
141 Global Civic Sharing website, "Frequently Asked Questions", Retrieved on May 1, 2013,
from http://www.gcs.or.kr/english/subl 5.php
142 Global Civic Sharing website, "Vietnam", Retrieved on May 1, 2013,
from http://www.gcs.or.kr/english/sub2 3 1.php
143 Kang, Moon-kyu, the chairman of GCS, Personal Interview, February 4, 2013
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Saemaul project disappeared and Saemaul officers would learn about this several years
later due to the language barrier and lack of information on Vietnam."
Since VKCC has an office in Hanoi and is obligated to operate only within the
Hanoi area according to its working contract, all the Saemaul diffusion projects that go
through VKCC remain in Hanoi. When Director Choe notifies the People's Committee of
the district level with potential Saemaul project, he first contacts those Committee
members whom he has been closely working with-a coterie created by Director Choe's
personal networking.145
Through process-tracing interviews, it was found that Director Choe of VKCC is
the most influential figure in the process of NGO-led Saemaul projects, especially when
coming to a decision on the recipient community. Choe is also the one who conveys the
message of Vietnamese local administrators to Gumi Saemaul officials-usually when
the health center needs additional medical supplies. When Gumi Saemaul sends money to
VKCC, Mr. Choe buys the medical supplies by himself and carries them to the health
center, to avoid any accidental loss of money.14 6
This shows how the Saemaul NGOs entrust VKCC and the gravity of VKCC's
responsibility in the process of Saemaul diffusion in Vietnam. Lastly, VKCC conducts
evaluation on behalf of Gumi Saemaul officers. Often, the Gumi Saemaul staffs cannot
come to Vietnam due to lack of financial resources to travel, and even if they come, it is
difficult to conduct an effective evaluation due to the language difference.
44 The interviewer requested to remain anonymous.
145 Choe, Y-Kyo, "Director of VKCC", Personal Interview, February 28, 2013
146 Choe, Y-Kyo, "Director of VKCC", Personal Interview, February 28, 2013
147 Chung, Dae-suk, "Director of International Division in Gumi Saemaul", Personal Interview, January 24,
2013
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In sum, the diffusion process of NGO-led Saemaul projects may be independent
of the South Korean government, but it is wholly dependent on the Vietnamese local
government as all the international project must pass through People's Committee and
PACCOM. The government has the power to decide and control the degree of diffusion
in the socialist state. Therefore, the aid project may be effective from the Vietnamese
perspective, yet it may be less satisfying from the donor country's standpoint as all facets
of the diffusion process, from what to do and how much of it to do, are controlled by the
recipient country.
Hypothesis 4: External factors to the Saemaul diffusion agreement-such as the similar
nature of top down system of the two countries or minor actors whose names were not
prominent in the diffusion agreement or MOU-in fact make substantial differences or
produce significant impact on the degree of diffusion.
As described above, the nature of the socialist government makes substantial
differences in the degree of diffusion. For example, the local government has control over
the disclosure of information so it can decide on what to ask for in an aid project. They
can also control and restrict foreigners' activities. The difference between the national
government and local government is that while the national government from the Khoi
Ky project showed passion to learn and develop their own method, the local government
from the Lien Phuong project just followed orders from the top officials and was
reluctant to learn and transform their behavior, even though many had received Saemaul
training sessions in South Korea. In this aspect, NGO-led Saemaul diffusion is more
about one-time unilateral donation than the sharing of the Saemaul development model
and spirit.
72
The "supposedly" minor actor in the diffusion process-VKCC-was more active
than the Gumi Saemaul office. The VKCC staffs were more involved from the start, from
preparing the project proposal to analyzing the impact of the Saemaul project. On the
process of choosing a beneficiary district, bias based on VKCC Director Choe's personal
network came to the fore, as he would give notice of the South Korean aid project to only
a Committee of a district familiar to him.
In sum, the NGO-led Saemaul diffusion project showed the necessity of re-
defining, re-prioritizing, and differentiating what the Saemaul Undong development
model is at the international level. This type of project reflected the rising voice within
Saemaul Undong NGO offices in South Korea to revamp the system for more efficient
international activities. Currently ongoing Saemaul projects are not so different from
what other international NGOs are doing.14 8 The project also indicated the importance of
having an expert in the targeted country, as the director of VKCC took on all the tasks
that a properly trained Saemaul specialist would.
CHAPTER 11. CASE 3: THE LA BANG PROJECT
My third and final diffusion case is that made possible through a sisterhood
agreement between two respective provinces in South Korea and Vietnam. The most
noticeable projects of this nature are pursued by Gyeongsangbukdo (North Gyeongsang
Province) in eastern South Korea. There are few Saemaul diffusion projects undertaken
148 International NGOs such as Oxfam and Development Workshop, bilateral governmental organization
such as JICA, and religious organizations share similar projects in the rural sector of Vietnam, according to
an interviewer who requested to remain anonymous.
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by provinces in South Korea.149 Amongst the few, Gyeongsangbukdo has the strongest
pride in promoting the Saemaul Undong, as the province is the birthplace of the late
President Park Chung Hee, who initiated the movement. This province is still considered
a leading actor of the Saemaul Undong both on the domestic and international front. It is
widely recognized within South Korea as taking the most active role in Saemaul projects.
Of all the provinces in South Korea, Gyeongsangbukdo spends the highest share of the
local government budget annually on Saemaul projects.
From 2005 to 2007, Gyeongsangbukdo led a series of Saemaul project in the La Bang
commune of the Dai Tu district, Thai Nguyen province, which is located in the same
district as the Khoi Ky commune as described in Chapter 5. It is about 3.5 hours north of
Hanoi by bus. The population of the La Bang commune is approximately 3,750, and is
composed of five minor ethnic groups.150
[Map: La Bang, Dai Tu district, Thai Nguyen province, Vietnam]
149 They are Gyeongsangbukdo, South Chungcheong Province, Gyeonggi Province, Jeju Province, and
Seoul (special self-governing capital), according to Lee, Kyungwon, "Director at Gyeongsangbuk Saemaul
office", personal interview, February 4, 2013
150 Tung, Tran, "Section Chief of Dai Tu district", Personal Interview, February 1, 2013
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A Saemaul pilot project was first requested by the former Prime Minister of
Vietnam, Phan Van Khai, to the governor of Gyeongsangbukdo, Lee Eui-geun, in 2003.
La Bang was chosen to be the recipient commune because its economic and agricultural
structures were very similar to those of South Korea in the 1960s .15 The main purpose of
this particular project was to provide the basic social infrastructure to the La Bang
commune so that the villagers could have better living standards with increased income.
The La Bang project was led and heavily subsidized by the government of
Gyeongsangbukdo. 2 Therefore, it is categorized as a local government activity.
151 Jae-sung, Hwang (2006, June 16)
is2 Gyeongsangbuk province financially subsidized approximately 74 percent of the Saemaul Meeting Hall
construction in La Bang commune, according to: Lee, Kyungwon, "Director at Gyeongsangbuk Saemaul
office", personal interview, February 4, 2013
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Nevertheless, it was still implemented in cooperation with the Gyeongsangbukdo
Saemaul Office. This NGO contributed partially, with individual donations and the
donation of goods such as clothes, home appliances, and school supplies, as well as
voluntarily assisting Vietnamese when they visited the North Gyeongsang Province for
Saemaul training sessions.13
Below is list of actors and organizations involved in this La Bang Saemaul
project:
From Vietnam:
- Prime Minister of Vietnam
- Thai Nguyen province governor
- Dai Tu district country governor
- Local administrators of Thai Nguyen province
- People's Committee of province level, district level, and commune level
- Villagers
From South Korea:
- Governor of Gyeongsangbuk province
- Gyeongsangbuk Saemaul office
- Saemaul Academy in Kyungwoon University
Below is a table of the Saemaul project contents in the La Bang commune:' 54
153 Lee, Kyungwon, "Director at Gyeongsangbuk Saemaul office", personal interview, February 4, 2013
14 based on resources received from Lee, Kyungwon "director at Gyeongsangbuk Saemaul office",
February 4, 2013
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Year La Bang Saemaul Project Content Cost (USD)
2005 Saemaul Meeting Hall 115,000
2005 Agricultural Machine & Cement 176,000
2005 Road Improvement & Facility Replacement Unknown
2005-2006 Health Center 100,000+
2005-2006 Saemaul Undong Training Session (40 32,000+
officials and village leaders)
2006-2007 Elementary School Unknown
2007 ~ Voluntary Services/Saemaul Training Unknown
While the cost of design and supervision, and other administrative processes were
covered by the North Gyeongsang Province,"' the Thai Nguyen province would cover
other extra costs. The villagers of the Lang Bang commune would provide their land and
their labor.
According to the head of the La Bang commune, the Saemaul project helped to
transform a neglected area where they could not even think about hygiene and sanitation.
It used to be a completely deteriorated commune back in 2005, where houses would
barely shelter people from rain.1 6 Today, the La Bang commune is entitled "Wealthy
Commune" by the local government and is no longer eligible to receive government
subsidy. 57 When I visited the commune in January of 2013, the overall condition was
spectacular, especially when compared to other villages I have visited. The streets were
clean and the houses and buildings-the health center and elementary school-were well
built with signs of excellent maintenance. This impressive result was also complemented
1 Done by setting a bank account in Dai Tu of Vietnam.
156 Jae-sung, Hwang (2006, June 16)
1, ibid.
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by the current NTP-NRD (National Target Programme-New Rural Development), which
created a synergy effect to further improve the commune and make it sustainable.
It is difficult to assess the impact of the Saemaul project solely because 1) it is
impossible to acquire a post-project evaluation done by Vietnamese government officials
due to their policy and political characteristic, 2) the evaluation undertaken by
Gyeongsangbukdo was not done by a comparative study of measuring poverty or health
index with numerical value. For instance, the evaluation reflected the satisfaction level of
villagers and local officers within the range from 0 to 7 on the Saemaul project: it was not
an accurate form of evaluation. It was only verbally confirmed that the diffusion project
was considered as "very successful" by both parties.
II. Testing the Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Politicians, contrary to the common belief that their role is limited to the
rhetorical, not only initiate the sister agreement or MOU but also can make substantial
differences in the degree of diffusion to the extent they show continuous commitment on
the particular cases they initiated.
As in the Khoi Ky project of 2001, the impetus came from the central government,
namely, when the former Prime Minister Phan Van Khai personally requested Governor
Lee for his support on Saemaul pilot program in 2003 .15' He was concerned about
Vietnam's development process particularly in the agricultural sector. While the country
is primarily an agrarian society, recent industrialization has been putting pressure on the
rural economy and a rapid shift of population to urban centers has been aggravating the
situation. Phan Van Khai is known to be the key figure of Vietnam's reform and
158 o 1 F 4- ,J-j "(Constructing a Saemaul pilot village in the back country of
Vietnam) Yonhap News, (2005, February 21) Received on May 1, 2013, from
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhnmode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=102&oid=001&aid=0000918466
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openness policy during the period of 1997-2006.159 When he gained verbal agreement
with Governor Lee, he introduced the Governor of Thai Nguyen to Governor Lee. The
two provinces signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2003, a bilateral
agreement that does not imply a legal commitment. Later, in 2005, the provinces signed a
legal protocol and sisterhood pact, and the Saemaul project started the same year.160 This
crucial role of the Prime Minister is not openly reported-although it is very much worth
highlighting.
Most importantly, and more than anyone, Governor Lee of Gyeongsangbukdo had
a tremendous impact in the diffusion of the Saemaul project. His ready willingness to
support a rural commune in Vietnam came from his strong belief and pride in the
Saemaul Undong. ' Lee started working for the government under former President Park
Chung Hee in 1978. Under the Park regime, Lee was in charge of the ongoing Saemaul
Undong movement in the late 1970s.162 According to interviews, Governor Lee was a
genuine believer in the Saemaul Undong. He had witnessed how this rural movement
reduced poverty significantly even in the most neglected villages in South Korea. This
strong belief is reflected in his career. After serving as governor of Gyeongsangbukdo for
fifteen years, Lee became the Chairman of the National Council of Saemaul Undong in
2008 .163 He emphasized the importance of reestablishing Saemaul Undong of the 21"t
159 He is the first Prime Minster to visit the United States and issued a joint statement with President Bush
in 2005. He also attracted many powerful foreign investors for Vietnam's economic growth.
160 Duyen, Vice Secretary of La Bang commune, Personal Interview, February 1, 2013
161 Choi, Jae-wang, (2008, October 20) "011 '1- 8-1" (Lee, Eui-geun, the Chairman of
National Council of Saemaul Undong) Maeil Newspaper, Retrieved on May 4, 2013, from
http://www.imaeil.com/sub news/sub news view.php?news id=47700&yy=2008
162 Bae, Han-chul (2002, June 13) " A } Ad - }, 0 q, - " (Lee, Eui-geun's profile:
Gyeongsangbukdo governor-elect) Maeil Newspaper, Retrieved on May 4, 2013, from
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhnmode=LSD&mid=sec&sidl=100&oid=00 9 &aid=0000216709
163 Choi, Jae-wang, (2008, October 20)
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Century, which should concentrate on international activities-the diffusion of the
Saemaul Undong.
Governor Lee visited the La Bang commune in 2003. The site triggered memories
of South Korea during the 1970s, and Lee saw the potential of applying the Saemaul
model in this commune. He also knew it would be better to support and focus on one
specific commune rather than branching out to other communes in Vietnam. Therefore,
he brought the idea of sisterhood pact that would not only extend the Saemaul diffusion
period in the Thai Nguyen province, but also legally ensure a portion of annual North
Gyeongsang government budget for this Saemaul diffusion project.'"
This is what differentiates this particular project from the NGO-led Saemaul
project in Lien Phuong. Saemaul NGOs often face difficulties in terms of locating and
securing sufficient funding for international activities. This often makes NGO-led project
a one-time construction project. However, securing a partial government budget to a
specific project is promising in terms of concentration, effectiveness, and sustainability.
For example, in 2005, USD 940,000 of the local government budget was reserved for
Saemaul initiatives. This was approximately 0.5 percent of the total annual budget. 65
According to my interview with Director Ahn at the National Council of Saemaul
Undong, "the most important factor regarding Saemaul projects-domestically and
internationally -is the willingness and passion of the head of local government. If he or
she has no interest, then the Saemaul Undong would never take off and be diffused. The
amount of government budget reserved for Saemaul activity also heavily depends on the
164 Lee, Kyungwon, "Director of Gyeongsangbuk Saemaul office", Personal Interview, February 4, 2013
165 According to the resources received from Lee, Kyungwon, Director of Gyeonsangbuk Saemaul office,
February 4, 2013
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willingness of the governor. Saemaul Undong is a powerful brand representing the North
Gyeongsang province.166 It can be a powerful tool that can link the province to the
international community."67 So, each year when the province's budget is calculated, the
Saemaul Undong is always on the top priority list. As of today, there are 33 Saemaul
diffusion projects undertaken in Vietnam by Saemaul NGOs and South Korean
provinces.168 Gyeongsangbukdo contributes to 18 percent of these projects. Including
Gumi city, which is in Gyeongsangbukdo, the two local governments represent more than
39 percent."' This illustrates how the enthusiasm of leaders can make a difference in the
diffusion process.
Hypothesis 2: Local administrative officers in charge make substantial differences in the
degree of diffusion to the extent that they are obliged by their role assignment to remain
continuously committed to their task.
Although the impetus may come from the national-level politicians, the provincial
authorities initiate the demands. The Thai Nguyen province officers took the initiative
once the two provinces signed the sisterhood pact. They prepared for the project and
developed its own proposal based on consultation with the People's Committee and
designated the La Bang commune as the location of the pilot project." They decided
what is needed in the commune-without any third party's intervention-and directly
requested the Gyeongsangbukdo office for what was needed. South Korean officials and
166 Gyeongsangbuk province is the hometown of late President Park.
167 Ahn, Chul-kyoon, "Director of International Cooperation Department of National Council of Saemaul
Undong", personal interview, January 21, 2013
168 Refer to Table 1 in Tables and Figures section
169 According to the resources received from Lee, Kyungwon, "Director of Gyeongsangbuk Saemaul
office", February 4, 2013
170 Duyen, Vice Secretary of La Bang commune, Personal Interview, February 1, 2013
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staffs from Gyeongsangbukdo government or Gyeongsangbukdo Saemaul Office visited
the project site only for MOU signing or ribbon-cutting ceremony."
This gave more opportunity to Vietnamese local authorities to control the content
of the projects after one another. This has both advantages and disadvantages. First, local
people have the best knowledge about their commune. Their consensus on what is the
most needed for specific village development can be a better guide than outsiders'
opinion. For example, 70 percent of the La Bang population is involved in tea production,
and today, the cost of local tealeaves has risen 3.5 times, while tea growers' income has
tripled or even quadrupled to more than USD 19,000 per year per hectare . 2 This would
not have happened if the Vietnamese local authorities did not constantly request the
authorities in Gyeongsangbukdo to share their advanced technology on tea cultivation
over several years." 3 This was one of the critical factors that contributed to increasing La
Bang tealeaves production. On the other hand, a potential disadvantage of having no
intervention from outside sources in the process is that it can leave the rural sector short-
sighted and poorly guided. Corruption may be carried on without any attempt to address
it. Also, if Saemaul experts did not become involved in designing and overseeing the
process, it would be difficult to assess whether the project has been implemented in a
"Saemaul" way, which is a common nagging question in the case of Vietnam.
Today, as Vietnam implemented NTP-NRD in 2010, it is the local government's
responsibility to manage, intervene in, and annually assess the progress of each
171 according to the pictures taken at the Saemaul Meeting Hall and at the elementary school
172 Thach, Ngoc (2012, August 23) "Cooperative economy, key to success in new rural development
program in La Bang" Vietnam Breaking News, Retrieved on May 1, 2013,
from http://vietnambreakingnews.com/2012/08/cooperative-economy-key-to-success-in-new-rural-
development-program-in-la-bang/#.UWSrpr-afog
13 Tung, Tran, "Section Chief of Dai Tu district", personal interview, January 29, 2013
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commune's development. According to Congresswomen Trinh Thi CuC 7 4 , post-Saemaul
La Bang commune was nominated as an exemplary village with the distinction of "Best
Village" in the province, one that had completed 12 out of 19 targeted goals of NTP-
NRD. These goals include social infrastructure indicators such as education system, post
office, income level, head count of poverty, production level, health index, safety, etc.175
The La Bang commune aims to reach all 19 goals by 2015. Local officials I have
interviewed seemed to be very proud of their commune and were very confident that they
would remain as the leading commune of NTP-NRD. The Section Chief of the district
told me, "Villagers can now pay for their children's education, feel more secure than ever,
and no longer live in poverty". 176 They boasted how La Bang motivates other communes
and villages to be like them.
Hypothesis 3: Was the NGO-led Saemaul diffusion independent from either
government? Has the project led by NGOs been more effective in terms of addressing the
needs of Vietnamese communities than projects led by other actors?
Although the project was a government-organized project, the Gyeongsangbukdo
Saemaul NGO still participated in the project. But its activity was not independent of the
government. NGO members would have to report all their plans and activities. They
considered this as cooperative operation with the Gyeongsangbukdo authorities."7
174 Who also served as Vice Governor of Thai Nguyen province
175 Asia and the Pacific Division Programme Management Department (2010, September) "Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, Tam Nong Support Project: Main Report and Appendices" International Fundfor
Agricultural Development (IFAD) REPORT No. 2296-VN, p. 2.
"I Tung, Tran, "Section Chief of Dai Tu district", personal interview, February 29, 2013
17 according to Lee, Kyungwon, "Director of Gyeongsangbuk Saemaul office", Personal Interview,
February 4, 2013
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In La Bang, Saemaul NGO members would provide voluntarily vocational and
Saemaul Undong training to villagers. A few members even made financial contribution
to the project. All the Saemaul NGO members who went to the La Bang commune were
self-supported.
So why are NGO people this active? There are about 251 Saemaul Undong NGO
branch offices throughout South Korea,' 8 and these are still considered as very powerful
and influential civil society organizations, especially in the rural sector. Serving as a
president or vice president at a local Saemaul NGO has become a ritual for many
politicians and high-ranking public administrators in the rural sector in the lead-up to
running for public election. Therefore, certain Saemaul NGO people would commit
themselves in major projects financially and physically to become recognized as a public
figure.
Hypothesis 4: External factors to the Saemaul diffusion agreement-such as the similar
nature of top down system of the two countries or minor actors whose names were not
prominent in the diffusion agreement or MOU-in fact make substantial differences or
produce significant impact on the degree of diffusion.
Two factors outside the government attributed to the success of the La Bang
commune. One is the Saemaul Academy at Kyungwoon University in South Korea, and
the other is current NTP-NRD program in Vietnam: Kyungwoon University works as a
partner to Gyeongsangbukdo in international Saemaul training, in which it is financially
supported by the province.
178 National Council of Saemaul Undong, "organization", retrieved on May 2, 2013, from
http://saemaul.net/organization.asp
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When the Vietnamese officials and villagers visit South Korea, they would be
registered at the Saemaul Academy. Saemaul Academy is distinctive in a way that the
program only accepts representatives from one country at a time, to provide them a
customized Saemaul training for a week. As of today, 53 Vietnamese representatives
have received the training on three occasions, from 2006 to 2009.179 Moreover, the
visitors from Vietnam would be registered to homestay with local Korean farmers. This
provides the Vietnamese the opportunity to be exposed to new agricultural technology.
Mr. Tran Tung mentioned that the Vietnamese visitors were amazed at some South
Korean farmers who were selling agricultural goods-like melon-online. A South
Korean expert was later invited to La Bang to introduce this online shopping
mechanism.180
The second factor that contributed to the success is the current Vietnamese
nationwide NTP-NRD program. The implementation of NTP-NRD had a significant
impact in terms of management, sustainability, and transmission of rural development on
the national level. In this way, the Saemaul Undong of the 1970s in South Korea is very
much aligned to the general objectives of the NTP-NRD. NTP-NRD is a holistic, cross-
sectoral, and integrated approach that "requires participation of diverse stakeholders,
policy improvements and numerous actions,"' under a socialist orientation. Below is a
table of general targets of the program in order to define new rural commune, district, and
province:
179 Saemaul Academy, "Saemaul International University: current status of Saemaul training", Retrieved on
May 2, 2013, from http://www.kw-sa.org/overseas/globalAca 03.php
180 Tung, Tran, "Section Chief of Dai Tu district", personal interview, February 29, 2013
181 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), "Terms of Reference for
Consultant/PSA", Retrieved on May 2, 2013, from
http://www .fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faovn/files/Administration/TOR for ME Tamnong.pdf
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Targets of NTP-NRD 5 2
2010-2015
1 20% of communes reaching targets as defined by the criteria of New Rural Development
2 Planning for New Rural Development for 100% of communes
3 Training for 100% staff with basic knowledge of organization, management, leadership to
build New Rural Development
4 Socio-economic infrastructure is improved
5 Incomes of rural people increased by 1.2 times
6 Poverty ratio under 8%
By 2020
1 50% of communes reaching targets as defined by the criteria of New Rural Development
2 Tasks to be completed country-widely
3 Complete system of social-economic structure for communes according to criteria applied to
New Rural Development
4 Incomes of rural people 2.5 times
5 Ratio of poor households is under 3%
In its multi-sectoral approach, the financing for the program comes from various
sources, mostly from national and provincial state budget resources and from the business
and cooperative sector.i83 The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)
takes the key responsibility of implementation and monitoring with other relevant
ministries. The program sets up a Provincial Steering Committee for each province and
steering committees at each district and commune level. The local government designs
innovative ways of intervention to expand the rural program into a nation program. It is
known to be "implemented through a developed and decentralized process"184 for
capacity building for provincial and district level authorities. The Saemaul pilot project in
the La Bang commune gave such incitement to the commune, that immediately following
the last official diffusion project in 2007, the commune was able to maintain and further
182Asia and the Pacific Division Programme Management Department (2010, September) p. 47.
183 (the governmental budget resources take approximately 40 percent and the business sector takes
approximately 30 percent of total finance for the program), Ibid. p. 48.
184 Ibid. p.15.
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develop with active participation by the local authorities and villagers under the national
program.
The most recent major Saemaul Undong diffusion project in Vietnam is that in the
La Bang commune. South Korean representatives claim that there will be no more
Saemaul Undong diffusion practice (except for smaller cases such as voluntary activities
led by Saemaul NGOs for fostering a friendly relationship) in Vietnam because the
recipient country is no longer identified as a less-developed country. 85 Moreover,
Vietnam's rural sector has been so ably guided by the national and local government; the
country is in transition to a market economy.
In the final chapter, I will summarize what was observed based on the cases in
Vietnam under the four hypotheses, what was significant in the diffusion process, what
was missing, and what should be done to complement the future roadmap of Saemaul
Undong diffusion practice from South Korea's perspective.
CHAPTER 12. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
So far I have described three Saemaul diffusion projects in Vietnam that were,
respectively, led by the central government, local government, and a regional NGO office
in South Korea. Within this context, I have observed how each actor that was involved-
politicians, the local authority, NGOs and other external factors-has influenced the
degree of diffusion. Saemaul diffusion from 2001 to 2010 also corresponds to the
chronology of the Vietnamese policy toward rural development; namely, in the initiating,
designing, and implementing process of the NTP-NRD. From these three cases, I draw
185 Interviewers requested to remain anonymous
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the following conclusions on the influence and limitations on the role of actors and
organizations:
1) Politicians: Politicians from the recipient country proved to be the most influential and
powerful at the point of initiation as well as the extension of the Saemaul project,
especially when they have the means to exercise control over the project. Because it is the
senior officials' responsibility to oversee the project, they are highly committed in the
process of diffusing the aid project. They retain leverage that differentiates the
development project from customary subsidy-oriented assistance through empowerment
of the local stakeholders and incorporating the project to their own national policy. Two
former prime ministers of Vietnam frankly asked South Korea for aid projects when they
sensed the urgent need of rural development in Vietnam. As was the case in the Khoi Ky
project, when the national government takes the step of overseeing the implementation of
the budget, the local administration and villagers also follow in their footsteps and
contribute-financially and physically-to the project. This induces the aid project to
become a participatory process.
However, when politicians are not involved in the diffusion of the aid project as
stakeholders, as was the case in the NGO-led Lien Phuong Project, politicians from both
the donor and recipient countries are relegated solely to the role of public relations,
whose only job is to sign the contract and appear with their staff at the ribbon-cutting
ceremony. They do not take any other responsibilities. It appears that politicians from the
two countries merely visit each other's region as a formality and with no significant
purpose. However, it appears that their numerous visits have built up amicable bilateral
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relations and trust over time, which has facilitated the implementation of the Saemaul
project over a long period, as in the Lien Phuong Project.
2) Local authority: The impetus for an international aid project may come from the
national level, but once the initiation phase begins, the decision making takes place at the
local level, by the local government of the recipient country. This has proved to be the
case no matter who initiates the aid project. Local authorities -People's Committee at the
provincial, district, and commune level -decide which commune to be recipient and
what the needs of that commune are. These local authorities conduct an internal
examination and design the aid project proposal, after which they submit the proposal to
the donor country. Due to the strict socialist top-down system, the local authorities in
Vietnam have the power to cut off the aid project when foreigners become too involved
in the process. According to South Korean staffs and officials," 6 this dynamic often puts
a cap on the scope of the project. For example, the Saemaul Undong diffusion is prone to
ending up as a one-time relief project rather than being diffused and extended as a
sustainable model. Saemaul Undong stresses on modifying the farm community's
individual and collective attitude; that is, instilling in each person a positive, "can-do"
spirit. However, under such restrictive conditions, it is almost impossible to diffuse the
"New Village" attitude, as such efforts often run up against a wall of socialist tradition.
The attitude of the local authorities directly bears on that of the villagers, which
has a direct impact on the likelihood of success of the aid project. The observed attitude
and behavior of the local authorities ran the gamut: The authorities either abided by
186 Most of Korean officials and staffs I have interviewed professed this view.
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entrenched bureaucratic practices without much interest in learning the foreign
development model or they were very much interested in learning and stayed closely
involved in the process with enthusiasm. Either way, the behavior of local authorities
directly influences those of its villagers. Ultimately, it has a direct impact on the success
and sustainability of the aid project.
This I perceived from a comparison of the Khoi Ky and Vihn Tranh communes.
The more interest the local authorities have, the more contributions they make. For
example, the Vihn Tranh governor and vice governor constantly visited the commune,
even at night, to meet the villagers and South Korean experts. This spurred the villagers'
brainstorming sessions and led to greater creativity in the process. Development, after all,
is at the core about encouraging the people to think in new ways and changing their
attitude. Practicing democracy within a small community imbued the villagers with a
strong sense of stewardship. It certainly bore on the positive attitude of the villagers and
the 100 percent of satisfaction at the project professed by both the villagers and local
administrators. In contrast, the Khoi Ky local authorities remained in their traditional
bureaucratic mold and showed a lack of interest in the project. They made little effort to
meet their financial term as set in original plan. This kind of apathy was also reflected in
the villagers' attitude. The villagers contributed even less labor than as set in the original
plan and ultimately did not maximize the potential of the Saemaul project.
My examination of the local authorities parallels the role of "street-level workers"
described by Michael Lipsky, in his book Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the
Individuals in Public Services (1980). Lipsky emphasizes the important role of street-
level workers in public service. In his book Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the
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Individuals in Public Services, Lipsky describes "street-level bureaucrats" as people who
work in street-level bureaucracies such as "schools, police, and welfare departments,
lower courts, legal services offices, and other agencies whose workers interact with and
have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public
sanctions. ")187 They are the real implementers of public policy as they interact with
citizens on a daily basis. However, they are often overburdened by various challenges
such as limited resources, the need to meet ambiguous agency goals,188 and following
organizational hierarchical structure that restrict their daily performances. The effect of
such common constraints are undermining their potential task and, in fact, even the
rerouting the intended direction of policy. What needs to be done, Lipsky asserts, is to
improve the process to bring these street-level bureaucrats' performances more in line
with agency goals, delivering public policy without distorting or undermining its original
intention. Particularly, the cases of the Khoi Ky and Vihn Tranh communes directly
reflected Lipsky's assertion on the role of street-bureaucrats. The local authorities in
Vietnam are "street-level bureaucrats," who manage the villagers' daily activities and
have substantial impact on the degree of Saemaul diffusion that they directly impact the
villagers' attitude and their level of participation in the project.
3) NGOs: Saemaul Undong in South Korea, which started as a government-led
movement, officially became a non-government organization-led movement in the late
1990s. The Republic of Korea National Council of Saemaul Movement, the umbrella
187 Lipsky M. (1980) Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individuals in Public Services. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, p. xi.
188 Ibid. pp. 41 & 165.
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organization of the movement, is a member of the UN Department of Public Information
(UNDPI) and United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSCO). 8 9 While the
Saemaul Undong council is a representative NGO with an extensive history, my
observations from Vietnam pointed to some systemic weaknesses and limitations of
NGOs in its international operation. On the other hand, some of their work in Vietnam
showed competency compared to other projects undertaken by different actors.
The problems associated with Saemaul NGO activities in Vietnam include the
lack of financial resources, absence of regional expertise, and poor organization.
Since all international activities are self-funded by each regional NGO offices,
there is always the issue of money. Financial resource in aid project is critical because it
has a direct influence on the project's efficiency and sustainability. As observed, most
projects led by the Saemaul NGO of Gumi city are short on funding; in several cases, the
NGO did not even have the funds for NGO personnel to visit the site during the diffusion
process or for project assessment. It seemed that NGOs are prone to initiating an
international project once they collect just enough money to proceed on the first step, for
example, of constructing a building, even without any further guarantee of the funding
for the next step.
The lack of expertise and long-term funding on the part of the NGO usually meant
that the projects initiated were a short-term or even a one-time relief operation without
much "Saemaul Undong" significance attached to them. The Saemaul Undong council in
South Korea does not have any staffs with international specialty, so it has been difficult
to communicate with or even collect data about the recipient country. This may have
189 National Council of Saemaul Undong website, "Brief History", Retrieved on May 2, 2013, from
http://saemaul.net/briefhistory.asp
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empowered the local authorities to take control over the project. Letting the recipient
country to draft proposals without any intervention during the process is different from a
collaborative or participatory aid project. The Saemaul Gumi NGO handed over their task
to another South Korean NGO located in Vietnam, VKCC, for communication with
Vietnamese officials. This kind of lack of oversight and expedient delegation of power
proved deficient, from the initial delivering of the funds for the project to and post-
project assessment.
The Saemaul NGO in South Korea also lacked field experts who could diffuse the core
lessons of the Saemaul Undong on-site. The Saemaul Undong in the 1970s in South
Korea was about the process of participation and empowerment of the farmers. In South
Korea, the national government distributed materials and let the villagers decide what to
do with them, and later the government would reward successfully transformed villages,
thereby making the process competitive and effective. This core lesson was not reflected
in the Saemaul NGOs' work in Vietnam. Even if the Saemaul NGOs provided "Saemaul
Undong" training sessions in South Korea, this would be very different from on-site
training in terms of integrating the ideas and knowledge at the local level and making the
development aid sustainable.
Lastly, I observed that the Saemaul NGOs in South Korea are often not well
coordinated in international activities. There seems to be no global manual with basic
guidelines for international Saemaul diffusion practices. This also corresponds to the
poorly defined role of Saemaul NGOs. For example, the Saemaul NGO's role in a
provincial sisterhood project is different from that in the NGO-led Lien Phuong project.
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In spite of the weaknesses and limitations above, some of the smaller-scale
projects carried out by NGOs, such as cow bank, vaccination, and then provision of
medication, proved to be competent and viable, and which are still in operation today.
This is because the projects demanded that the villagers pay for what they get. The
villagers had to save money to repay for the endowment in three years for the cows, and
the health care centers charged villagers for vaccination shots and medications so that the
health center staffs can buy more medicine and continue serving the people. In other
words, in this instance, the villagers had become partial stakeholders.
My examination of Saemaul NGOs in Vietnam parallels the roles of NGO as aid
providers in the secondary source literature. According to research by UNRISD, 90 NGOs
may be less successful at more complex intervention, but they perform better when they
have built up expertise, as in delivering local-level services. NGOs face limitations, as
they cannot provide a broader framework for action such as policy direction. NGOs are
often not very good at coordinating with each other or even with the state for determining
the operational scale and costs. When comparing works done by NGOs and the state,
whichever with more money for the project seem to provide better quality services.
4) Other elements: First, I observed that long-term collaborative study by research
institutions from both countries would likely yield the most effective form of foreign aid.
There are the real workers formulating Vietnamese national policy, especially the NTP-
NRD. And national policy is the ultimate goal of development assistance. The recipient
country must stand by itself for further development. Furthermore, research by scholars
9 0 Agg, C. (2006, June) "Trends in Government Support for Non-Governmental Organizations: Is the
"Golden Age" of the NGO Behind Us? United Nations Civil Society and Social Movements Programme,
Paper Number 23, p. 5.
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seemed to be more effective than short-term Saemaul Undong training sessions held in
South Korea either by the National Council of Saemaul Undong or the local university.
Second, I observed that inherent socialist characteristics, such as strict top-down
command, seem to hinder reform and further advancement. Moreover, changing the local
authorities' behavior or the villagers' attitude proved to be a tall task in view of the
cultural differences and political impediments.
CHAPTER 13. A Roadmap for Future Saemaul Undong Diffusion Projects
All the Saemaul diffusion projects to Vietnam are categorized as foreign aid, not
ODA. South Korea officially joined as a DAC member of the OECD and became a donor
country in 2009. In December 2010, South Korean Prime Minister Kim Hwang-sik
announced that he would form a special task force for Saemaul Undong diffusion, and
specifically for ODA. Kim also increased the portion of ODA budget for the Saemaul
Undong. Prime Minister Kim recognized the importance of branding South Korea's
unique development model, and the need to disseminate it to developing countries more
efficiently and systematically.'9
What should be recognized, in addition, is that today's developing countries may
face greater challenges than South Korea in the 1960s. Today, there are more
complicated and stringent requirements imposed on the developing countries by the
advanced world. According to UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organization),
"poorer developing countries may find it much harder under current conditions to foster
industrial development and structural change than earlier generations of states that hauled
191 "7j , Alo } 0 d-^} TF _"J" (the National Government Formed Saemaul Undong TF for ODA)
Chosun Newspaper, (2010, December 21) Retrieved on May 2, 2013,
from http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html dir/2010/12/21/2010122101809.html
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themselves out of poverty, like the so-called Asian tigers." The new challenges that
today's developing countries face include "integration into global value chains, the
shrinking of policy space in the present international order, the rise of the Asian driver
economies, new opportunities provided by resource-based industrialization, the
accelerating pace of technological change in manufacturing, how to deal with jobless
growth in manufacturing, creating adequate systems of financial intermediation, and how
to respond to the threats of global warming and climate change.""' Moreover, many
developing countries are bound by multilateral and bilateral trade agreements that
provide insufficient attention to the developing countries' particular financial needs and
are drafted and customized by the rich countries. The developing countries' lack of
experience in multilateral and bilateral negotiations and lack of knowledge of how they
would be affected by the rich countries' demands often place these developing countries
in a vulnerable position.'94 Therefore, these new challenges require new thinking by
policymakers, scholars, and international development experts so that change that would
actually allow for the socioeconomic development of the third world can take place.
So far, the Saemaul Undong has been well received in the recipient countries as
foreign aid particularly in the development of farming and fishing villages. However, the
overall diffusion process was far from effective because these projects were implemented
192 United Nations, (2013, April 1 1)"Poorer countries may find it harder than ever to foster
industrialization, UN warns", UN News Centre, Retrieved on May 17, 2013, from
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=44625&Cr=unido&Crl#.UZWp 7 5 WadQU
193 Ibid.
194 C.D. Birkbeck & M. Harbourd "Developing Country Coalitions in the WTO: Strategies for Improving
the Influence of the WTO's Weakest and Poorest Members" Global Economic Governance Programme.
GEG Working Paper 2011/63 (July 2011), retrieved from http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-
content/uploads/Deere-and-Harbourd.Developing-Country-Coalitions-in-the-WTO.pdf and J. M. Finger
and J.J. Nogues, "The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: the New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations"
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without interdepartmental liaison. This led to the projects being dispersed with
overlapping aid funds. In the absence of a central division that oversees international
Saemaul Undong activities of the South Korean government, local government, and
Saemaul NGOs, inefficiency was almost preordained.195 Fortunately, the task force team
that the South Korean government formed in 2010 is now in liaison with 11 other
associated departments and institutions in South Korea with expertise in ODA, rural
development, Saemaul Undong, and specialized skills in farming and fishing, with the
Prime Minister's Office as the head office for Saemaul Undong ODA.
As of today, Rwanda and Laos are chosen to be demonstration project locations
and the investigation team formed by the South Korean government has already
conducted field survey. Prime Minster Kim announced that the Saemaul diffusion
projects in these countries would start in late 2012.196
Based on my observations in Vietnam, I would argue that the Saemaul Undong
diffusion process should be managed by the South Korean national government via
bilateral aid in ODA, while providing the recipient communities with incentives to
remain fully involved in the process. KOICA should execute the diffusion project as this
organization can best deliver direct assistance through its regional offices in many
developing countries, with regional experts. The diffusion work should still be
implemented in collaboration with the National Council of Saemaul Undong, as NGOs
already have wide-ranging experiences in Vietnam.
195 Ibid.196
196 Ahn, Hokyoon (2011, August 26) "Al } , l IT ODA Y 2 -" (Saemaul Undong as South
Korea's Representative ODA Model) Joongang Newspaper, Retrieved on May 2, 2013, from
http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total id=6058402&ctg= 1200
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Analyzing the success and failure of past practices at the micro-level would help
South Korea deliver "glocalization" to the target regions. KOICA's collaboration with the
National Council of Saemaul Undong would deepen the significance of "Saemaul
Undong," intensify rural development expertise, and reduce duplication of aid since
smaller projects that were NGO-led. This would increase efficiency. The newly
inaugurated President of South Korea, Park Geun Hye, is the daughter of the late
President Park Jung Hee. Should the new South Korean leader revive the legacy of her
father, it is anticipated that the Saemaul Undong may become a global model of
development aid diffusion. With impetus from the government, South Korea's "New
Village Movement" of the 1970s would be diffused more effectively than ever to
agricultural sectors in developing countries for implementing sustainable projects that
promote the recipient countries to stand and grow independently. The lessons of the
Saemaul Undong, as manifested in both the positive and negatives cases in Vietnam are
clear: the key to success lies in empowering the villagers and encouraging the recipient
government to become stakeholders in a long-term national policy of rural development.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Saemaul Undong projects in Vietnam
Actor(s) in South Project Location in Vietnam Project length
Korea
KOICA (national road, dike, canal construction, Khoi Ky (Thai Nguyen), 2001-2003
government) community building, kitchen Vihn Tranh commune
renovation
NCSU/MOSPA Road improvement, cow-banking, Hatay Province, Kim Ahn 2001-2005
kitchen improvement commune
NCSU/MOSPA Kindergarten &middle school Quoc Oai district, Dai
construction, cow-banking, kitchen Thanh commune
improvement
NCSU/MOSPA Health center construction, Quoc Oai district, Huoi
reservoir construction Tek commune
Choongchungnam- Cow-banking Hatay Province, Kim Ahn 2001 (4/28-5/3)
do SMU commune
Gyeonggi-do Reading room construction Dai Thanh, Huoi Tek, 2002 (9/25-
(province) Kim Ahn communes 10/2)
Gyeonggi-do Reading materials supply Dai Thanh, Huoi Tek, 2003
(province) Kim Ahn communes
The city of Gumi Health center construction, health Hanoi Lien Phuong 2001-2002
SMU materials supply commune (10/30-12/9)
The city of Gumi Reading room construction, health Hanoi Dax commune 2003-2004
SMU materials supply (10/15-7/24)
The city of Gumi Reading room construction Hanoi Lien Phuong 2004 (7/20-
SMU commune 7/24)
The city of Gumi Saemaul Undong training in South Hanoi 2004 (12/1-
SMU Korea 12/5)
The city of Gumi Rehabilitation center construction Hanoi Dax commune 2005 (6/22-25)
SMU
The city of Gumi Reading room construction Hanoi Lien Phuong 2005 (6/22-25)
SMU commune
The city of Gumi Health and reading materials Hanoi Dax commune 2007 (10/30-
SMU supply 11/3)
Gyeongsangbuk-do Saemaul community center Thai Nguyen, La Bang 2005 (Feb-Oct)
(province) construction village
Gyeongsangbuk-do Agricultural machines/cement Thai Nguyen, La Bang 2005 (7/8-7/14)
(province) supply village
Gyeongsangbuk-do Road improvement Thai Nguyen, La Bang 2005
(province) village
Gyeongsangbuk-do Health center construction Thai Nguyen, La Bang 2005-2006
(province) village
Gyeongsangbuk-do Saemaul Undong training in South Thai Nguyen, La Bang 2005 (6/13-
(province) Korea village 6/19)
Gyeongsangbuk-do Elementary school construction Thai Nguyen, La Bang 2007 (1/20)
(province) village
Seoul Elementary school construction Thai Nguyen, Sun 2004-2005
_ 
__ 
(July-March)
99
Tguyen village
Jeju-island Book supply Hatay Province, Kim Ahn 2005 (6/20-
commune 6/25)
The city of Yongin Elementary education materials Hanoi Man So Ahn, Sun 2005 (5/15-
SMU supply Tguyen villages 5/19)
Gangwon-do SMU Elementary school construction Hanoi Man So Ahn 2003-2004
village (Nov-July)
Gangwon-do SMU Elementary school students Hanoi Man So Ahn 2004 (4/24-5/5)
exchange program village
Gangwon-do SMU Cow-banking Hanoi Man So Ahn 2005-2007
village (Nov-Nov)
The city of Elementary school renovation Hanoi Man So Ahn 2004 (6/9-6/13)
Chuncheon SMU village
Busan SMU Low-income family supporting 39 households in Vietnam 2001
Daejeon SMU Cow-banking 2001
Yeonchun SMU Book supply 2007 (1/30-2/3)
Jongro SMU Book supply Hanoi Sun Tguyen 2007 (2/28-3/2)
I __ villages
(Source: Lee, Kyungwon. "Director at Gyeongsangbuk Saernaul office", received on 4 February 2013)
Figure 1. South Korea ODA Distributional Channel
(Source: http://www.koicacambodia.org/koreas-oda-framework/)
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Tables 2. ODA from South Korea
Net ODA 2009 2010 2011 Change 2010/11
Current (USD m) 816 1,174 1,321 12.6%
Constant (2010 USD m) 933 1,174 1,242 5.8%
In Won (billion) 1,040 1,356 1,463 7.9%
ODA/GNI 0.10% 0.12% 0.12%
Bilateral share 71% 77% 73%
South Korea's ODA by sector
Unspecified
Humanitarian aid
Debt relief i
Programme assistance
Multi-sector MODA by sector (USD million)
Production
I Economic infastructureI
Other social infastructure
Education, health, and
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Top 10 Recipients of South Korea's gross ODA (USD)
1 Vietnam 82M
2 Afghanistan 59M
3 Mongolia 36M
4 Bangladesh 36M
5 Sri Lanka 34M
6 Indonesia 30M
7 Cambodia 27M
8 Philippines 27M
9 Laos 26M
10 Angola 24M
(Sources: http://www.oecd.org/dac/korea.htm)
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Table 3. ODA for Vietnam
Receipts 2009 2010 2011
Net ODA (USD million) 3,732 2,940 3,514
Bilateral share (gross ODA) 57% 64% 61%
Net ODA/GNI 4.0% 2.9% 3.0%
Net Private flows (USD million) 1,746 3,216 3,762
For reference 2009 2010 2011
Population (million) 86.0 86.9 87.8
GNI per capita (Atlas USD) 1,030 1,160 1,260
Top 10 Donors of Gross ODA (2010-11 average; USD millions)
1 Japan 1,234
2 International Development Association 976
3 Asian Development Bank Special Funds 306
4 France 290
5 Australia 129
6 South Korea 124
7 Germany 116
8 United States 102
9 Denmark 69
10 United Kingdom 59
Bilateral ODA by Sector (2010-11)
0% 10% 20% 30%
* Education
0 Economic infrastructure & Services
0 Programme Assistance
40% 50%
0 Health and population
UProduction
* Action relating to Debt
60% 70% 80%
mOther social sectors
* Multisector
EHurranitarian Aid
(Sources: OECD-DAC, World Bank; www.oecd.org/dac/stats)
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i i i i i - I
Figure 2. Saemaul Undong NGO Organization Structure
Krea Seemv undeng Cete
(Source: http://saenai1.net/organiization.asp)
Figure 3. Global Civic Sharing Organization Structure
(Source: http://www.gcs.or.kr/english/subl 3.php)
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